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Unwilling to use military force, the Western powers, acting through the UN Security 
Council, relied heavily on economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) [referred to as FRY (SIM)] to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in wars of secession in Slovenia, Croatia, and 
finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Warring factions divided themselves up along ethnic lines with 
the Serbians being labeled as the aggressors in the conflict. Economic sanctions were 
implemented against the FRY (SIM) in May 1992. Economic sanctions were devastating to 
the FRY (SIM) economy. By 1993, FRY (SIM) President Slobodan Milosevic indicated his 
support for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. 
The Bosnian-Serbs failed to support the peace plan, resulting in the tightening of sanctions on 
the FRY (SIM). The intent of the tightened sanctions was to force Milosevic to represent the 
Bosnian-Serbs in future peace negotiations. This strategy worked as indicated by the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
work examines the role economic sanctions had in ending that conflict. Recommendations 
. are provided to policy makers regarding the future use of economic sanctions. 
vi 
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Economic sanctions have been used by nations to coerce other nations for many years. 
Throughout history, nations learned that restraints on trade could be a powerful, coercive 
policy instrument in modifying a target state's behavior. Today, the United Nations, acting 
through the Security Council (UNSC), can employ substantial economic pressure in order to 
curtail or deter the aggressive action of a target nation, however, they seldom did so during 
the Cold War years. Between 1945 and 1990, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions twice, 
against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. 
Since the Cold War, the world's major powers and the United Nations are 
increasingly using economic sanctions to achieve international political objectives. From 
1991 to 1998, the U.N. Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions eight times, one of 
which was directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) [or 
FRY (SIM)] in 1992. Due to their increased frequency, economic sanctions have resurfaced 
at the center of public policy debate. Some analysts maintain that sanctions are incapable of 
achieving significant results while other analysts state that under certain circumstances and 
conditions, sanctions are likely to succeed in altering the behavior of the target nation. 
The available analysis regarding the former Yugoslavia case asserts economic 
sanctions were not effective in bringing about peace in the Balkans. These writings, 
however, were written prior to the end of the Bosnian conflict in 1995. With the ending of 
the conflict, as signified by the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, a gap exists in the 
analysis of the role economic sanctions had in achieving policy goals in the former 
Yugoslavia. The aim of this thesis is to fill that gap in analysis by investigating the role 
sanctions played in ending the war and implementing the peace accord. 
xiii 
Sanctions penalize the target country for its undesired behavior. The theoretical basis 
for sanctions rest in rational-choice theory. The target country will weigh the costs imposed 
by sanctions against the potential benefits obtained from continuing its policies, and 
determine their net gain or net cost. The higher the net costs, the more likely the target 
country will change its policies. 
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), was both complicated and violent, due to 
its ethnic diversity. When BiH declared its independence in March 1992, the former 
Yugoslav army ONA) had 94,000 troops garrisoned in the country. When the JNA 
"officially" withdrew in June 1992, only 14,000 troops went back to Serbia. Initially, the 
Bosnian Serbs held over 70 percent of BiH. Military forces were divided primarily along 
ethnic lines, with the BiH army maintaining some ethnic diversity. The conflict in the 
country involved simultaneous fighting between Croatians and the BiH, Serbs and the BiH, 
Croatians and Serbs, and even Muslim versus Muslim. By fall 1995, the BiH, in conjunction 
with Croatian forces, were able to regain some of the territory previously lost to the Serbs. 
The final peace settlement, the Dayton Peace Accord, gave 51 percent of BiH to the newly 
formed, but tenuous, Muslim-Croat federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. 
The beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century saw the former Yugoslavia 
in a precarious situation. Its economy in shambles due to the inefficiencies of socialist self-
management, the former Yugoslavia needed to modernize its economy. This required 
massive reorganization and assistance from the West. However, just as the federal 
government began implementing economic reforms, four of the country's republics declared 
their independence and economic reforms rapidly took second stage to the requirements of 
xiv 
war. In short, four decades of socialist self-management and the fragmentation of the former 
Yugoslavia economies left the FRY (SIM) vulnerable to the effects of economic sanctions. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the work of three economists, 
Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott (hereafter referred to as HSE). HSE 
studied 116 sanction episodes since World War I with the purpose of identifying 
circumstances where economic sanctions succeed in attaining foreign policy goals. Their 
work focuses on three major questions: What factors - both political and economic - usually 
result in a positive contribution of sanctions to the achievement of foreign policy goals? 
What are the costs of sanctions to both target and sender countries, and to what extent do they 
influence policy decisions? And what lessons can be drawn from this experience to guide 
policymakers on the use of sanctions in the future? HSE's bedrock study on economic 
sanctions identify six political conditions and five economic conditions that are conducive to 
the successful implementation of economic sanctions and achievement of foreign policy 
objectives. 
Four UN Security Council Resolutions constituted the sanctions regime against the 
F.RY (SIM): UNSCRs 713, 757, 787, and 820. UNSCR 713 was the arms embargo against 
the former Yugoslavia and UNSCR 757, 787, and 820 initiated the economic sanctions and 
implemented their enforcement against the FRY (SIM). The sanctions devastated their 
economy and forced their president, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his support to the war. 
The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995 signified the achievement 
of a major foreign policy goal in the Balkans. The UNSC determined that sanctions may well 
have been the single most important reason that made the FRY (SIM) accept a negotiated 
peace agreement in Dayton in November 1995. 
xv 
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Figure 1. Map of the Former Yugoslavia 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Available on line (internet) from the University of Texas library 
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Economic sanctions have been used by nations to coerce other nations for many years. 
From the Seven Years War in the eighteenth century through World War I, nations learned 
that restraints on trade could be a powerful, coercive policy instrument in modifying a target 
state's behavior'! With the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the world had a new tool 
for an old strategy. The United Nations, acting through the Security Council, theoretically 
could employ substantial pressure in order to curtail or deter the aggressive action of a target 
nation. The United Nations (UN), however, seldom imposed economic sanctions during the 
Cold War years. Between 1945 and 1990, the UN Security Council imposed economic 
sanctions twice, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977.2 
Since the Cold War, "the world's major powers and the United Nations are 
increasingly using economic sanctions to achieve international political objectives."3 From 
1991 to 1998, the U.N. Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions eight times, one of' 
which was directed against the former Yugoslavia in 1992.4 Due to their increased 
frequency, economic sanctions have resurfaced at the center of public policy debate. Some 
1 The earliest recorded sanction occurred in ancient Greece with Pericles's Megarian decree, enacted in 
response to the kidnapping of three Aspasian women. This embargo allegedly led to the Peloponesian War. 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d ed. 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 4 . 
2George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Sanctions: Do They Work?" Bulletin o/the Atomic Scientists 
(November 1993), p. 14. 
3RobertA. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22:2,1997. p. 90. 
4lbid. By 31 August 1994, the UN. Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq (1990), former Yugoslavia 
(1992), Libya (1992), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), the UNITA movement in Angola (1994), and Rwanda (1994). 
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analysts maintain that sanctions are incapable of achieving significant results while other 
analysts state that under certain circumstances and conditions, sanctions are likely to succeed 
in altering the behavior of the target nation. 
The available analysis regarding the former Yugoslavia case asserts economic 
sanctions were not effective in bringing about peace in the Balkans. These writings, 
however, were written from 1993 through early 1995, prior to the end of the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the ending of hostilities, as signified by the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Accord, a gap exists in the analysis of the role economic sanctions had in achieving 
policy goals in the former Yugoslavia. The aim of this thesis is to fill that gap in analysis by 
investigating the role sanctions played in ending the war and implementing the peace accord. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
The words, "sanction," "embargo," and "blockade" have been used interchangeably at 
times, thus adding to the confusion and controversy in analyzing effectiveness. This problem 
hampers and confuses policymakers and analysts in determining whether or not economic 
sanctions can change another state's behavior. Therefore, it is important to understand what 
economic sanctions consist of and what they do not. 
Policymakers and government officials use a variety of tools to influence other 
governments. These tools, in increasing order of severity and coercion, are diplomatic 
2 
efforts, public appeals, non-economic coercion, economic coercion (or economic warfare), 
and military action.5 
1. Economic Warfare and Measures Other Than Economic Sanctions 
Economic warfare consists of coercive foreign policy measures taken by a state to 
influence or change the policies of another state by economic means. This domain of 
coercion, different from military action, consists not only of economic sanctions, but also of 
covert and overt measures undertaken to manipulate another state's economy. This section 
will further defme non-sanction economic warfare, while the following section will define 
economic sanctions. 
Examples of non-sanction economic warfare include economic espionage, the illegal 
transfer of technology, and the manipulation of world markets.6 According to Robert Pape, 
"Economic warfare seeks to weaken an adversary's aggregate economic potential in order to 
weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war."7 
Another scholar notes that the former Soviet Union "engaged in a sinister and very dangerous 
game of economic warfare against the United States" in the manipulation of the strategic 
5 Adapted from Richard Hull's work on international sanctions. Hull uses the terms "non-economic 
sanctions" and "economic sanctions" in place of non-economic coercion and economic coercion. The author's 
definition of non -economic coercion is synonymous with Hull's "non-economic sanctions." However, HUll's 
term "economic sanctions" is not all encompassing and has been modified. Richard Hull, Imposing 
International Sanctions: Legal Aspects and Enforcement by the Military [book on-line] (WaShington D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1997, accessed 21 April 1998); available from 
http://www .ndu.edu/ndU/insslbooks/sanctions/contents.html; Internet. 
6Por more details regarding economic espionage, see John J. Pialka's War by Other Means: Economic 
Espionage in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997). 
7Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90-
136. 
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metals (chromium, cobalt, zirconium, titanium, and tantalum) market.8 Strategic metals are 
vital to a modem, high-technology, industrial society, as well as that society's military. The 
United States is about ten percent self-sufficient in strategic metals while the former USSR 
was about 90 percent self-sufficient.9 As such, the United States imported much of these 
metals from Africa. 
The Soviets, keeping their domestic supplies un-mined and in reserve, competed with 
the United States on the world market, thus driving up the price. The Soviets also used other 
measures - propaganda, disinformation, and guerilla warfare - to destabilize the strategic 
metal producing countries and drive up prices. In Zaire, these activities caused the price of 
cobalt to increase 600 percent from 1979 to 1981.10 
Economic warfare consists of a wide range of measures, only one of which is 
economic sanctions. The examples listed above obviously fall outside of a conventional 
wisdom definition of economic sanctions, yet both are coercive in nature. 
2. Econonricsanctions 
Economic sanctions are a subset of economic warfare and, according to Hufbauer, 
. Schott, and Elliot, are defined as ''the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat 
8Pred W. Walker, "Strategic Concepts for Military Operations," in Psychological Operations: Principles 




of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations."ll Excluded in this definition are 
positive economic incentives, such as providing foreign aid or credits. These positive 
incentives may be utilized with economic sanctions in a "carrot-and-stick" manner. 
The term, "sender," refers to "the country (or international organization) that is the 
principal author of the sanctions episode" and the term, "target," "designate[s] the country 
that is the immediate object of the episode."12 There are three types of economic sanctions, 
or in other words, "three main ways in which a sender country tries to inflict costs on its 
target: by limiting exports, by restricting imports, and by impeding finance, including the 
reduction of aid."13 The limitation of exports and the restriction of imports are referred to 
collectively as trade sanctions, while the limitation on finance is referred to as financial 
sanctions. Examples of financial sanctions include prohibiting private financial transactions 
between a sender country's citizens and the target country, freezing or confiscating bank 
assets of the target government, and restricting the target's access to financial assistance from 
organizations such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.14 Hufbauer, Schott, 
IlGary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d 
ed. (Washington D.C.: Institute for Il1ternational EconOmics, 1990),2. This work encompasses 116 case studies 
and is the most comprehensive analysis on economic sanctions to date. As such, this thesis draws heavily from 
their analysis and conclusions. 
12Ibid., 35. 
13Ibid., 36. 
14E~amples come from: Robert P. O'Quinn, "A Users Guide to Economic Sanctions" [on line] (The 
Heritage.Foundation: 25 July 1997, accessed 28 April 1998); available from 
http://www.heritage.orglheritagellibrary/categories/tradelbg1126.htrnl; Internet. Also, Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "For Effective and Appropriate Sanctions" [on line] by Jean Prevost, 
Economic and Trade Policy, Policy Staff Paper 93104 (March 1993, accessed 28 April 1998); available from 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.calenglishlforeignp/draitlpolicy-1/93_04_e.html; Internet. 
5 
and Elliot (hereafter will be referred to as HSE) consider trade and financial sanctions to be 
included in their overall definition of economic sanctions. As such, so will this paper)5 
HSE's definition of economic sanctions is not without its critics. Robert Pape, in his 
article "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," is the most critical of the HSE definition. I6 
Pape uses a very strict definition of economic sanctions, soley attributing the suspension of 
trade to the definition. He does not include naval blockades in the definition, nor does he 
include financial sanctions in his definition. 
Pape states that a naval blockade is a "component of a coercive strategy based on 
force," not on economic coersion)7 Pape uses examples from World War I and n to 
demonstrate that a naval blockade is a "coercive strategy centered on [military] force," and 
not one centered on economics.I8 While this was true in these two examples, the naval 
blockade, or maritime interception operation, against the FRY (SIM) was not centered on the 
use of force, it was centered on economic coersion. Further, the Allied blockades of 
Germany during both World Wars were targeted against the adversary and its allies, while the 
maritime interception operation against the FRY (SIM) was targeted against all merchant 
shipping, regardless of the ships nationality (flag, owner, homeport, or point of origin). In 
15Some recent analyses of the sanctions episode in the former Yugoslavia debate whether financial 
sanctions, and not trade sanctions, were solely responsible in achieving foreign policy goals. See George A. 
Lopez and David Cortright, "Financial Sanctions: The Key to a 'Smart' Sanctions Strategy" [on line] (The 
Fourth Freedom Forum: Fall 1997, accessed 11 September 1998); available from 
http://www.fourthfreedom.org/sanctions/financialSanctionsSmartSanctions.html; Internet. 




short, operational characteristics differ in the use of 'naval blockades;' while Pape's 
definition of 'naval blockade'is historically correct, it does not take into consideration the 
new security environment that maritime forces will be operating in, where they are going to 
be an enabling force used to help find a political solution. 
In regards to financial sanctions, Pape raises an interesting point and one that is 
currently being studied for the FRY (S/M) case, that being the role of financial sanctions. 
David Owen, in his book Balkan Odyssey, states that financial sanctions played a 
predominant role in achieving foreign policy goals in the FRY (S/M).l9 Effectively, 
however, fmancial and trade sanctions both cause economic disruption in the target country. 
The collective definition, or as Pape calls it, "the common definition," will be used in this 
paper.20 This issue of the effectiveness of financial sanctions versus trade sanctions is 
noteable, however, it is one for further research. 
At the other end of the definitional spectrum is David Baldwin. In his book, 
Economic Statecraft, Baldwin argues for a looser definition. Baldwin argues that economic 
sanctions should be broadened to encompass all aspects of "economic statecraft" including 
.trade disputes, engaging in economic warfare, rallying domestic support, demonstrating 
resolve to third party audiences, or simply inflicting punishment.21 This broadened definition 
makes it difficult to measure the sanction's success or effectiveness as the components of 
190avid Owen, Balkan Odyssey (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 124-125. 
20Pape, ''Why Sanctions Do Not Work," 97. 
21David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985),373. 
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success differ between rallying domestic support and achieving a foreign policy goal. Again, 
HSE's "common definition" will be utilized. 
3. Maritime Interdiction and Blockades 
Embargos are the ordered suspension of commerce through the forbidding of the 
target state's ships from leaving or entering the target's ports carrying specific goods. A 
blockade represents a more severe form of coercion, "that of achieving the aim of the 
sanctions by the complete [emphasis mine] denial of access with the aim of completely 
disrupting trade and/or starving the targeted country into submission."22 A blockade not only 
restricts the target state's ships, but those of neutral states as well. Historically, embargos 
and blockades denote the enforcement of a sanction, usually by a maritime force, and are 
generally considered an act of war or as a prelude to war. The UN-mandated operations 
against Iraq (1990 - present), the former Yugoslavia (1992 - 1996), and Haiti (1993 - 1994) 
are recent exceptions to this, as the maritime forces involved were not considered combatants 
in the conflict. 
Since the tenn "blockade" has war-like connotations to it, new tenns were introduced 
to describe this old fonn of sap.ction enforcement. One scholar notes, "In the United States, 
the term 'blockade' is no longer politically correct, and the terms 'interdiction' and 
'interception,' which are not defined in intemationallaw, are now definitely preferred, to 
avoid a connotation of war with the targeted State and all the legal and political consequences 
22Captain Robert H. Thomas, Royal Dutch Navy, "The Use of Naval Forces in Imposing and Enforcing 
Sanctions, Embargoes, and Blockades," TO, August 1993, 3. 
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this would entail."23 Although "a rose by another name," this paper will refer to the 
enforcement of economic sanctions as 'interception' or 'interdiction' operations. 
4. Embargo 
"Embargo" is often used synonymously with other actions and events in a sanctions 
episode, thus creating confusion as to its exact meaning. As defined in the preceding section, 
an embargo is the prohibition of the target state's ships from leaving or entering the target 
state's ports. 
One of the elements of the sanctions regime on the former Yugoslavia is commonly 
referred to as the "arms embargo." While the specifics of this element will be discussed in 
Chapter Three, the use of the word "embargo" in this context is somewhat confusing, given 
the definitions already provided. The "arms embargo" should be considered a non-economic 
coersive measure, as it was not directed at the target country's economy. Rather, the "arms 
embargo" was targeted at the warring factions' military capabilities by limiting armament 
availability during the conflict. 
Although the arms embargo was not part of the economic sanctions episode against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SerbialMacedonia), a brief analysis of its effects will be 
offered in Chapter IV. 
5. Foreign Policy Goals 
Foreign policy goals are defined as "encompass[ing] changes expressly and 
23Richard Hull, Imposing International Sanctions: Legal Aspects and Enforcement by the Military [book 
on-line] (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1997, accessed 21 April 1998); 
available ,at http://www.ndu.edulndulinsslbooks/sanctions/contents.html; Internet. 
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purportedly sought by the sender state in the political behavior of the target state."24 HSE 
classified the foreign policy goals from their historical case studies into five categories, 
according to the major foreign policy goal sought by the sender country: (1) to change target-
country policies in a relatively modest way (for example, in human rights and terrorism 
cases); (2) to disrupt a minor military adventure (UK sanctions against Argentina over the 
FalklandlMalvinas Islands); (3) to destabilize the target government (U.S. campaign against 
Castro); (4) to impair the military potential of the target country (sanctions imposed in World 
Wars I and II); and (5) to change target-country policies in a major way (ending apartheid in 
South Africa). 25 
A sanctions episode may have more than one objective. For example, destabilization 
usually presupposes a lesser goal and attempts to impair the military power of the target-state 
usually has an explicit or implicit goal of destabilizing the target country's government. In 
cases of multiple goals, HSE classify the case by the most difficult objective. For the single 
case of the former Yugoslavia, the lesser goals, as well as the implicit goals, will be analyzed. 
B. SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Sanctions penalize the target country for its undesired behavior. The theoretical basis 
for sanctions rest in rational-choice theory. The target country will weigh the costs imposed 
by sanctions against the potential benefits obtained from continuing its policies, and 
24Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2. 
25Ibid., 38. 
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determine their net gain or net cost. The higher the net costs, the more likely the target 
country will change its policies. 
The enactment of sanctions sends a triple message. According to HSE, "To the target 
country it says the sender does not condone your actions; to allies it says that words will be 
supported by deeds; [and] to domestic audiences it says the sender's government will act to 
safeguard the nation's vital interests."26 Sanctions also punish the target country for illicit 
behavior, to deter it from future transgressions, and to rehabilitate the target country's 
leadership. Sanctions also fill the gap in certain foreign policy instances when diplomatic 
efforts do not apply enough coercion and military action would be too coercive. 
While the theoretical basis and implementation of sanctions seem sound, sanctions 
often do not succeed in changing the behavior of foreign countries. HSE identify four factors 
to explain why sanctions fail. 
The first reason for failure is that the sanctions imposed may be inadequate to the 
task. The sender county's goals may be unclear or elusive, the means too mild or, if needed, 
cooperation from other countries may not exist. The second reason for failure is that 
sanctions may create their own antidotes. Specifically, economic sanctions may unify the 
target country both in support of its government and in search of commercial alternatives. 27 
The third reason for failure is that the target country may tum to powerful or wealthy 




the Cold War. For example, U.S. sanctions against Cuba and Nicaragua drove those 
countries further into the former Soviet sphere of influence. Additionally, USSR sanctions 
against Yugoslavia in 1948 - 1955 caused that country to turn to the west for economic and 
military assistance. 
Finally, economic sanctions may alienate allies abroad and business interests at home. 
This factor most commonly relates to unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States. 
Since sanctions force the target county to seek commercial relations elsewhere, domestic . 
businesses lose market shares to their competitors. Boeing losing the Iranian airline market 
to Airbus is a classic example. Besides the loss of sales, domestic businesses jeopardize their 
reputation for reliability in a sanction-happy foreign policy regime. Allies also feel the 
effects of sanctions when the sender country tries to enforce its unilateral measures 
worldwide, as the United States did in the 1981 - 1982 Soviet-European pipeline case. U.S. 
allies often wondered who was the target of the sanctions, the Soviets or their own firms. . 
The feud that results between the sender country and its allies often undercuts the sanctions' 
economic and psychological potency, making them ineffective. 
Despite these pitfalls and contemporary critiques of sanctions, they are still being 
used. Why then are they frequently being used? The answer is twofold. First, with the end 
of the Cold War, the UN Security Council is able to pass its resolutions without the 
constraints of the Soviet veto and the United States is able to enact sanctions without fear of 
driving the target state into the Soviet sphere of influence. Secondly, sanctions provide 
policy makers an alternative to diplomatic measures that may be too insignificant, yet still 
avoid the high costs of war. 
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c. PLAN OF THE THESIS 
To answer the research question - the effectiveness of economic sanctions in 
achieving peace in the Balkans - this thesis will look to two time periods in the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the period between 1991 and 1995 and second, the signing and 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (December 1995 to the present). 
The Bosnian Serbs had the military advantage when Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its 
independence in 1991 and experienced tremendous successes on the battlefield from 1991 
through 1994, nearly crushing the anny of Bosnia-Herzegovina (primarily the Bosnian-
Muslims). By late 1994, the war had stabilized in favor of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and by late 1995, it was able to go on the offensive. This offensive resulted in ending the 
siege of Sarajevo and recapturing territory lost to the Bosnian Serbs earlier in the war. 
The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in December 1995, ended the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The lifting of economic sanctions were reportedly one of the key negotiation 
points for Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SerbialMacedonia), to agree on the terms of the peace accord.28 Further, the United 
. Nations, United States, and Western European nations continually used economic sanctions 
in a "carrot and stick" manner to ensure the former warring factions (Croatian, Muslim, and 
28The new state of Serbia and Montenegro is commonly referred to as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), or FRY (SIM), although it is not yet officially recognized by the United States. 
13 
Serbian - both state entities and their respective proxies in Bosnia-Herzegovina) would 
comply with the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord. 
Chapter II will provide the necessary background information on the former 
Yugoslavia, focusing on the characteristics of the former Yugoslav economy which made it 
vulnerable to sanctions, and the historical and geo-political information of the area. Chapter 
III will discuss HSE's theoretical arguments on implementing a successful sanction episode 
and introduce the UN Security Council's Resolutions that implemented the sanctions regime 
on the FRY (SIM). Chapter IV will use these theoretical arguments to analyze the empirical 
evidence that shows sanctions were effective in achieving foreign policy goals in the former 
Yugoslavia. Chapter V is the conclusion chapter and will offer modifications to HSE's 
theoretical arguments and recommendations. The Annexes will describe the maritime 
interception operation in the Adriatic that enforces the sanctions regime and provide a 
summary of NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. 
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D. BACKGROUND 
An understanding of the past throws light on current conditions in the Balkans. For 
this reason, a brief overview of former Yugoslavia's history and economy will be given. 
This chapter is divided into three areas. The first section will briefly outline the history of the 
former Yugoslavia, concentrating on the breakup of that country. The second section will 
provide an overview of the former Yugoslav Army. The background provided in this section 
is important when analyzing the effects that the arms embargo and economic sanctions had 
on the milit&ry. The third section will offer a profile of the economy, and identify key aspects 
that made the economy vulnerable to the effects of economic sanctions. This section will be 
followed by a chapter summary. 
A. HISTORY AND GEO-POLITICAL ISSUES 
The history of the Balkans is long and bloody. Ethnic rivalry in this region can be 
traced back over 500 years. The history of the region and its influence on today's conflict is 
certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, a brief historical sketch will be provided. 
The former Yugoslav~a was born out of the ashes of World War I. The country 
consisted of six major ethnic groups and their corresponding regions: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Additionally, two provinces were 
included in what is present day Serbia, Vojvodina (primarily consisting of Hungarians) and 
Kosovo (over 90 percent of the population are Albanian). During World Warn, ethnic 
infighting was fierce between the Croats (aligned with Nazi Germany) and the Serbs (aligned 
with the Allies). The fighting in the country was both a part of World War n as well as an 
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internal civil war. Some historians argue that the present conflict stems directly from 
atrocities committed during World War 11.29 
Joseph Tito, a wartime resistance leader and a communist, emerged from World War 
IT as Yugoslavia's leader. From 1945 until his death in 1980, Tito had a frrm grip on power 
in Yugoslavia. Tensions within Yugoslavia's federal system emerged after Tito' s death, 
however. This ethnically and religiously diverse federation of six republics and two 
autonomous provinces survived under a collective government for ten years after his death. 
In the spring of 1990, democratic elections following the collapse of the communist 
system brought nationalist and independence-minded governments to power in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Serbia. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Their 
secession was due not only to ethnic factors, but also to economic factors. Slovenes and 
Croats achieved higher standards of living compared to Serbia and the other southern regions. 
Growing economic disparities between the regions, both real and perceived, fed the engine of 
secession as the Croats and Slovenes grew tired of sending large portions of their net profits 
to the unproductive regions in the south. These differences culminated in independence 
declarations and also ignited a brief conflict between the Slovenes and the Yugoslav Army 
and a protracted conflict between Croatia and the Serbian minority ("Krajina Serbs") 
supported by the Yugoslav Army. 
29''Except for devastating casualties in inter-communal civil war within a wider triune war during World 
War n, which occurred in exceptional circumstances and with external (Axis) provocation, most of them have 
lived in relative peace - although not necessarily in harmony - for most of the centuries that two or more of 
them have cohabited in many countrysides and towns." Dennison Rusinow, Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Sabrina 
Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 13. 
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By the end of 1991, the Krajina Serbs controlled almost one-third of Croatia. In 
September 1991, in order to stem the fighting, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed 
Resolution 713 against the former Yugoslavia. This resolution was the arms embargo and 
was applied to all of the newly formed countries from the former Yugoslavia. 
The multi-ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was reflected in its position on 
national issues. The republic supported conservative, federal policies until the late 1980s 
when it was threatened by the heightening of nationalist movements in the other regions of 
the Yugoslav federation. The official position of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to support ethnic 
reconciliation within the federation. Despite their efforts, the nationalistic fervor was too 
intense. In March 1992, voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina overwhelmingly approved 
independence. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted this vote. The Bosnian Serbs, backed by the 
Serbian-controlled Yugoslav Army, thus began forcible resistance to Bosnia's independence. 
By spring 1992, the Bosnian Serbs controlled more than 70 percent of Bosnia's 
territory. Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing of BOsnian Muslims and Croats became a tactic of 
the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). Outraged at Serbian atrocities, UNSC issued Resolution 757 
in May 1992. UNSCR 757 called for total economic sanctions placed against Serbia and 
Montenegro [now referred to as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, SerbiaIMontenegro or FRY 
(SIM)]. 
Despite UNSeR 713 and 757, the FRY (SIM) continued to support its Serbian 
proxies ·in Bosnia and ethnic cleansing continued. The UNSC responded with Resolution 
787 in November 1992. This resolution calls for the strict implementation ofUNSCR's 713 
and 757. These two resolutions were never effectively applied to the FRY (SIM) nor 
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enforced. The UNSCR 787 enforces them by authorizing monitoring on the Danube River 
and in the Adriatic Sea. In effect, UNSCR 787 establishes the maritime interception 
operation against FRY (SIM). 
In April 1993, after the Bosnian Serbs failed to support the Vance Owen Peace Plan, 
the UNSC issued UNSCR 820 against FRY (SIM). This resolution tightens the sanctions and 
calls for stronger enforcement measures on the Danube River and in the Adriatic Sea. In 
addition, the United States has helped block FRY (SIM) membership in financial institutions 
such as the IMF, World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Further, the United States froze all foreign assets of FRY (SIM) and their proxies in Bosnia, 
the Bosnian Serbs. These actions are termed the "outer wall" of sanctions. 
B. MILITARY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
The status of armed forces in the former Yugoslavia, both up to and during the wars 
of secession, were heavily reliant on the doctrine and tactics utilized by Tito and his 
communist Partisans' during World War II. Tito's Partisans (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) 
not only fought the Germans, but the Ustase (pro-fascist regime in Croatia), the Cetniks 
(Croats, Serbs, and Muslims who favored the formation of a multi-ethnic republic), and Serb 
supporters of the Serbian regime in exile. Throughout the fighting, the Partisans relied on 
guerilla tactics against their enemies. 
Emerging victorious from World War II, Tito was strongly influenced by his 
successes in guerilla warfare. This experience, coupled with Tito's split with Stalin (which 
was further exacerbated by the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956), led Tito to establish the 
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concept of Total National Defense (TND). This concept is a two-tiered approach to 
defending the country. The first tier would be the use of the regular anny, or Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA).30 The second tier would be the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and 
the local population. Doctrine called for the close coordination of the two tiers. The JNA 
would provide direct fire support (air support, tanks, and artillery) to the TDF during military 
operations.31 
The center of gravity for the TDF was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the JNA postured its 
forces to defend the country not only from possible NATO attacks in the west, but also from 
a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack in the east. Further, the mountainous terrain in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was ideal for the guerilla, partisan war that Tito envisioned. "Thus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina became the favoured location for storing arms and supplies and building arms 
and munitions factories."32 As a result and coupled with its heterogeneous population, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced the fiercest fighting in the wars of secession. The large 
amount of anns available in Bosnia-Herzegovina raises serious issues about the effectiveness 
of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. These issues will be dealt with more 
specifically in Chapter IV. 
30Also known as the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA). In April 1992, the YPA changed its name to the 
'Army of Yugoslavia' or JA (also referred to as YA) to reflect the territorial change. 
31 Milan Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review 4, no. 
10 (October 1992): 445. 
32United Nations Security Council, "The Military Structure, Strategy, and Tactics of the Warring Factions," 
Annex III, in Final Repon of the United Nations Commission of Expens [on-line] (New York: United Nations, 
28 December 1994, accessed 01 May 1998), S11994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I); available at 
http://www.uwe.ac.uklfacults/ess/comexpertlANXlIII.htm; Internet. Final report of the UN Commission of 
Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780 (1992). 
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The wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia went through three stages. The first 
phase was the war in Slovenia, the second in Croatia, and the third in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As nationalism and secession reached feverish heights in 1990, the INA conducted pre-
emptive seizures of TDF weapons caches in Slovenia and Croatia. These efforts were not 
totally successful, however. Further, in order to offset the loss of TDF weapons, Slovenia 
and Croatia expanded their imports of arms. 
Slovenia declared its independence in June 1991. This conflict involved the JNA, 
Slovenia's TDF, Slovenian troops who left the JNA and formed the Slovenian Army, and the 
Slovenian police force. Despite the JNA's overwhelming firepower, the conflict lasted only 
ten days. The INA, showing great restraint, retreated from Slovenia into Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Serbia. 
The second stage was the war in Croatia. The Croatian TDF units and Croatians who 
left the JNA fonned the Croatian Army (HV). The HV not only feared attacks from the JNA, 
but from the large Serbian minority living in the Krajina region of Croatia. The JNA 
fonnally withdrew from Croatia in November 1991, but continued to support the army of the 
self-proclaimed Serb Republic of Krajina. INA troops withdrawing from Croatia entered the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina republic in anticipation of conflict there. The Krajina Serbs maintained 
their territorial holdings until September 1995 when the newly re-organized and re-equipped 
HV swept through the Krajina and defeated the Serbs. Subsequently, the HV has been 
accused of ethnic cleansing as thousands of Serb refugees fled to Serbia and Serb-held 
territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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The third stage, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), was the most complicated 
and most violent due to the ethnic diversity. The ethnic breakdown of BiH consisted of 
approximately 44 percent Muslims, 26 percent Serbs, and 17 percent Croatians (the 
remaining 13 percent consisted of other groups like Bulgarians, Albanians, Hungarians, et 
cetera). Because of its ethnic diversity, the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's policy was to 
maintain and support the federal Yugoslav state.33 As events transpired and nationalist 
fervor rose, it became impossible to adhere to this policy. 
When BiH declared its independence in March 1992, the JNA had 94,000 troops 
garrisoned in the country. Military forces were divided primarily along ethnic lines, with the 
BiH army maintaining some ethnic diversity. The conflict in the country involved 
simultaneous fighting between Croatians and the BiH, Serbs and the BiH, Croatians and 
Serbs, and even Muslim versus Muslim. The forces involved were the JNA, the Bosnian-
Serb Army (BSA), the HV, the Bosnian-Croat army (HVO), and the BiH Army. The JNA 
had approximately 94,000 troops in BiH. When they "officially" withdrew in June 1992, 
14,000 troops went back to Serbia. The 80,000 troops, with equipment, that remained 
claimed to be from BiH. Initially, the Bosnian Serbs held over 70 percent of Bill. By fall 
1995, the BiH, in conjunction with the HV and HVO, were able to regain some of the 
territory previously lost to the Serbs. When the final cease-fire went into effect in 1995, 
Muslim and Croat forces held approximately 55 percent of BiH. The final peace settlement, 
33Because of Bosnia-Herzegovina's multi-ethnic society, many members referred to themselves as 
Yugoslavs. Because inter-marriage was prevalent and when the war broke out, some were unsure as to which 
ethnic group they belonged to. 
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the Dayton Peace Accord, gave 51 percent of BiH to the newly formed, but tenuous, Muslim-
Croat federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. 
C. ECONOMY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
A comprehensive, well-balanced description of such a fragmented economy as the 
former Yugoslavia's is difficult and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight certain general sectoral and perfOImance characteristics of the former 
Yugoslav economy. These specific aspects will provide the reader with an insight as to how 
this economy was susceptible to the consequent effects of economic sanctions. 
What follows is first, a description of the former Yugoslavia's unique economic 
system entitled socialist self-management; second, an overview of the economic results from 
the former Yugoslav economy as well as the inherent problems that resulted from their 
unique economic system; and finally, a review of the country's international trading policy 
and practices, its reliance on certain types of imports, and its trading partners. 
1. Socialist Self-Management 
The economy of the former Yugoslavia was unique of the world economies, typically 
described as a hybrid of communism and capitalism. 'Transcending both private capitalism 
and state capitalism, self-management socialism was to institute direct democracy in 
economic matters, with decision making power as the exclusive prerogative of individuals 
directly affected by decisions, and with individuals directly exercising their power without 
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the intervention of autonomous intermediaries."34 Under the leadership of Tito, "it became 
the only nation to implement a worker-managed market socialist system [also known as 
socialist self~management]."35 
Initially a strong Stalinist, Tito broke with Stalin in 1948 and declared political 
independence from the Soviet Union.36 The Yugoslav-Soviet break led Tito to develop the 
distinct economic system known as socialist self-management. This hybrid drew from 
numerous aspects of socialist ideological literature. Tito was a "true-believing Marxist," yet 
his system also selectively drew from utopian socialist ideals (worker self-management) and 
from Engels' central planning.37 This system was codified and elaborated further in the 1974 
Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor of 1976 and remained the distinctive element 
of the former Yugoslav economy until 1990. Socialist self-management consisted of "state-
owned enterprises in a one-party state, operating with little central planning according to 
market forces, and with management appointed by worker-selected boards."38 The Federal 
34Martin Schrenk. Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A. Tatawy, Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and the 
Challenges of Development (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979),3. 
35J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Mariana V. Rosser, Comparative Economies in a Transforming World Economy 
(Chicago: Irwin, 1996),332. 
36In 1961, Tito's Yugoslavia became one of the three founders of the nonaligned movement, along with 
India's Nehru and Egypt's Nasser. 
37Rosser and Rosser, Comparative Economies, 341. To counter Stalin'S charge of being anti-Marxist, Tito 
sought to justify ideologically his approach by ''relying on selected quotations from Marx and Engels and other 
socialist literature to provide an ideological justification for their model." 
38Ibid., 67. 
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Research Division of the Library of Congress describes the concept of socialist self-
management in the former Yugoslavia in the following way: 
The original self-management concept redesignated [sic] enterprises as work 
organizations of associated labor and divided them into smaller units at the level of 
factory departments. Each smaller unit, a BOAL [Basic Organization of Associated 
Labor] was a self-managed entity, financially and commercially independent. As 
members of basic organizations, workers had the right to attend general meetings and 
elect and serve on workers' councils. The councils were elected bodies that 
formulated business policy and plans, made investment and borrowing decisions, 
approved enterprise accounts, and gave fmal approval to directors and management 
boards. Despite these extensive nominal powers, however, decisions by the workers' 
councils were heavily influenced by enterprise directors, who were appointed by the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), as the CPY [Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia] was called after 1952. Only one-third of the committees nominating 
enterprise directors could come from the councils; the remainder were members of 
local communes and trade unions, all still controlled by the LCY in 1990. In the final 
step, the workers' council chose from the nominating committee's list of candidates, 
but in most cases the list contained only one name at that stage.39 
The use of self-management agreements and social compacts were other unique 
elements of the Yugoslav economic system. These agreements were binding contracts and 
enforceable in the Yugoslav court system. These contracts were used to allocate the income 
generated by the company to either higher wages or new investment in the company.40 
This system was seen as a more accurate depiction of Marxis~, as the people owned 
and operated the means of production. "By comparison, the former Yugoslavs considered the 
Soviet system to be statist because the Soviet state had simply replaced the capitalists of the 
39Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Yugoslavia: A Country Study, 3d ed., ed. Glenn E. Curtis 
(Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1992), 131. 
40Jbid. 
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West in exploiting the worker clasS."41 By giving the "factories to the worker," policy makers 
established a system that transferred economic management from the state to the workers. 
2. Overview of Economic Performance 
As with other socialist economies, land reform, the nationalization of industry, and 
the establishment of collective farms were undertaken in the former Yugoslavia. The former 
Yugoslavia's unique economy, however, has encountered serious and persistent problems 
since W orId War II. Because of this uniqueness, the former Yugoslavia's economic 
problems were even more acute than the economic problems of the former Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact countries. These problems - such as, an oversized balance of payments deficit, 
domestic inflation, unemployment, and low capital and labor productivity - are common to 
developing economies, but have been made more acute because of the uniqueness of the 
former Yugoslavia's economy. 
As mentioned earlier, each factory was a self-managed entity, financially and 
commercially independent. This independence resulted not only in the misallocation of 
capital resources and higher income disparity, but also higher inflation and unemployment. 
When deciding upon the factory's fiscal and budgetary policy~ workers would forgo capital 
reinvestment in the factory in favor of increases in wages. This led to an eventual decrease in 
productivity as capital goods became outmoded and outdated. In response to this, the 
government would implement re-capitalization efforts. However, these efforts were largely 
41Ibid., 123. 
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inefficient and ineffective.42 Another consequence of socialist self-management was 
unemployment. Workers often chose higher wages at the expense of hiring additional 
workers. Labor productivity also suffered as a result. In short, a disproportionate amount of 
the factories' net profits went to higher wages at the expense of capital reinvestment and the 
hiring of additional laborers. 
Unemployment in a socialist society such as the former Yugoslavia offers an 
interesting paradox. One of the main tenets of socialist doctrine is full employment. Yet, 
this socialist concept was abandoned by the former Yugoslavia when the Communist party 
officially acknowledged in 1950 that unemployment could exist under socialism.43 The 
former Yugoslav leadership "had designed its society around the concept of community 
through labor, in which the core unit of social, economic, and political organization was the 
socialist workplace," or BOAL.44 Despite this, unemployment was acknowledged in 
Yugoslav society and this resulted in accentuating social tensions. The meaning of 
unemployment not only meant the loss of income and identity for the unemployed, it meant, 
"to be excluded from full membership in society - a loss of full citizenship rights, a second-
dass status, a disenfranchisement."45 This disenfranchisement led to the disillusionment of 
42Due to the law of diminishing returns. See Schrenk, Ardalan, and El Tatawy's Yugoslavia for a detailed 
description on the misallocation of capital in the former Yugoslavia. 




the former Yugoslav model, culminating in the abandonment of socialist self-management in 
1989. 
On the eve of the breakup, "Yugoslavia was in an unprecedented economic and socio-
political crisis. Nationwide, in 1989, the unemployment rate measured approximately 20 
percent, some 60 percent of the population were living at or below the poverty line, and 
inflation had climbed to a yearly 2,500 percent."46 Former Yugoslavia also had the highest 
per capita foreign debt in Europe, totaling $20 billion.47 
3. International Trade 
In terms of international trade, scholar Oscar Kovac notes: "The [former] Yugoslav 
economy was always highly import dependent. hnports of fuel and semi-fmished products as 
inputs into the manufacturing industries took between 2/3 and 3/4 of total Yugoslav 
imports."48 Because of this dependence, the country experienced a balance of payments 
deficit of over $3.6 billion in 1979. However, by the 1980s, a small surplus was achieved. 
This surplus was the result of state imposed import restraints coupled with significant real 
growth of exports, as shown in Table 2-1 as exports and imports share of the country's gross 
national product (GNP). 
46Dijana Plestlna, "Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia: The First Three Years," in Beyond Yugoslavia: 
Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. 
Adamovich (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 125. 
47Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Yugoslavia, 164. 
480scar Kovac, ''Foreign Economic Relations," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 286. The 
oil crisis of 1979 exacerbated the balance of payments deficit. 
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Table 2-1. Imports and exports as a percentage of GNP 
Year 
1978 1984 
Exports 11.1 18.8 
Imports 22.8 22 
Source: Oskar Kovac, "Foreign Economic Relations," 
Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 283. 
The former Yugoslavia's exports in the late 1980s consisted of manufactured goods, 
ores, and simple processed goods. Over one-quarter of goods sold abroad were machinery 
and transportation equipment. Livestock was the most important agricultural export 
(primarily veal to Greece). The country's main export customers were Italy, the Soviet 
Union, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the United States and West Germany.49 
The former Yugoslavia was a net importer of raw materials, fuels, iron and steel 
products, and capital equipment. The chief suppliers of petroleum products were the Soviet 
Union, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria. The former Yugoslavia always has had an overall shortage 
of energy resources. In 1989, domestic wells supplied only 26 percent of domestic raw 
petroleum requirements. Capital equipment was imported from West Germany, Italy, the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia. Due to the growing 
trade deficit, the former Yugoslavia adopted measures to cut non-essential imports and 
encouraged import substitution utilizing domestic industries. However, their reliance on 
petroleum products, raw materials, and capital goods remained. 50 




Initially, the fonner Yugoslavia's socialist self-management economy seemed to 
combine the best of capitalism and socialism. By 1980, however, the reality became clear 
that it combined the worst of both systems. Plestina states, "As inefficiencies mounted, 
output fell, unemployment and foreign indebtedness rose, inflation became hyperinflation, 
and severe regional economic inequalities grew worse."51 The latter intensified the ethnic 
and religious tensions present in the society.52 Further, the country's need to re-capitalize its 
economy led to trade deficits. Finally, the economy relied too heavily on imports of 
petroleum and raw materials. These problems were not only exacerbated by economic 
sanctions, but were targeted by them. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
The beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century saw the former Yugoslavia 
in a precarious situation. Its economy in shambles due to the inefficiencies of socialist self-
management, the fonner Yugoslavia needed to re-capitalize and modernize its industries. 
Further, it needed to privatize and transform its economy as the other Central European 
economies were doing. This required massive reorganization and assistance from the West. 
However, just as the federal government began implementing economic reform, 
macroeconomic improvements, and a privatization plan, four of the country's republics 
51Rosser and Rosser, Comparative Economies, 332. 
52As an example, with only 25 percent of former Yugoslavia's population, Croatia and Slovenia contributed 
to 55 percent of the federal budget. Both regions felt that the money provided to the federalist state was not 
providing any economic or pOlitical dividends in return (from Plestina "Democracy and Nationalism," p. 126). 
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declared their independence. Secession not only caused vital inter-republic trade relations to 
be broken apart, but the subsequent war caused immense damage to the infrastructure of the 
newly formed countries. Economic reforms rapidly took second stage to the requirements of 
war. The splintering of the country also had its effect on the military and the military 
industrial complex. In short, four decades of socialist self-management and the 
fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia economies left these newly formed nations 
potentially vulnerable to the effects of economic sanctions. 
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Ill. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
The purposes of this chapter are two-fold. First, to introduce and discuss economic 
sanctions in terms of Huibauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE).53 With HSE's theoretical 
framework in had, the following section will introduce the economic sanctions imposed on 
the former Yugoslavia. 
HSE's study conducts a comprehensive analysis of 116 cases since World War I 
where sanctions were used for foreign policy purposes. The authors identify various political 
and economic variables that effect the outcome of a sanctions episode. From these variables, 
HSE derive nine recommendations to be used when implementing a sanctions regime. The 
first section of this chapter will introduce and summarize HSE's methodology, the political 
and economic variables' effect on a sanctions episode, and their nine recommendations on 
implementing sanctions. In the following chapter, HSE's work will be used to analyze the 
effect sanctions on the former Yugoslavia had in achieving foreign policy goals. 
With HSE's framework and findings in hand, the second part of this chapter will 
introduce the economic sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslavia by the United Nation's 
Security Council (UNSC). The four main sanctions are: United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 713, which is the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia; UNSCR 
757, the economic sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montep.egro); UNSCR 787, which authorized the enforcement of713 and 757; and UNSCR 
820, which tightens the sanctions regime by eliminating certain loopholes found in 757 and 
53From their book. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2d ed., vol. 2. 
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787. Finally, an overview of the financial sanctions imposed against FRY (SIM) will be 
offered.54 
A. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS - THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
HSE studied 116 sanction episodes since W orId War I with the purpose of identifying 
circumstances where economic sanctions succeed in attaining foreign policy goals. Their 
work focuses on three major questions: "What factors - both political and economic - usually 
result in a positive contribution of sanctions to the achievement of foreign policy goals? 
What are the costs of sanctions to both target and sender countries, and to what extent do they 
influence policy decisions? And what lessons can be drawn from this experience to guide 
policymakers on the use of sanctions in the future?"55 This section will summarize HSE's 
answers to these questions. These answers, derived from 116 case studies, will be used to 
analyze the sanctions episode on the FRY (SIM) in the following chapter. 
1. Determining Success - The Success Equation 
The success of an economic sanctions episode has two factors: one, the extent to 
which the sender's foreign policy goals were achieved, and two, the contribution made by 
sanctions to a favorable outcome. HSE uses these two factors in a simple equation to 
determine the success of a sanctions episode. Each factor is indexed on a scale of one to four 
and then multiplied to get a composite score, which indicates the success or failure of an 
54The financial sanctions include UNSeR 757, which prohibits financial transactions with the FRY (SM), 
and U.S. and western European efforts, which include the prevention of financial aid from organizations such as 
the World Bank and IMP. 
55HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 1. 
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episode. Thus, the composite score has a range from one to sixteen. In summary, the success 
equation looks like this: 











HSE determine that a score of nine or higher to be a successful episode. A score of 
nine would indicate that sanctions were a modest contribution to the goal; a score of sixteen 
indicates that sanctions were a significant contribution to a successful outcome. 56 By this 
definition, HSE classify 35 percent of the 115 episodes as successes, as depicted in table 3-1. 
Table 3-1. Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Polic~ Tool 
Number Number Success 
of of ratio 
N Successes Failures (% of total) 
All Cases 115 40 75 35 
Multilateral sanctions 
With U.S. involvement: 
1945-1990 78 26 52 33 
1945-1970 30 16 14 53 
1970-1990 48 10 38 21 
Unilateral u.S. sanctions: 
1945-1990 55 16 39 29 
1945-1970 16 11 5 69 
1970-1990 39 5 34 13 
Source: Kimberly Ann Elliott, "Evidence of the Costs and Benefits of Economic 
Sanctions," speech given before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means [on-line] (Washington D.C.: Institute for International 




HSE determine features of the four gradients in each of the factors. Their descriptions 
and an example from their case studies are as follows: 
a) Policy Result - Extent policy goals were achieved. 
A score of one indicates that policy goals were not achieved. An example of a 
failed outcome is illustrated by the Soviet attempt to destabilize Tito from 1948 -1955 (HSE 
case number 48-4). A score of two indicates ambiguity in determining the extent that policy 
goals were achieved, but there was possibly positive outcome. An ambiguous or unclear . 
result is illustrated by the Arab League's long campaign against Israel, which to some extent 
has isolated Israel in the international community (case 46-1). A score of three indicates a 
positive outcome or a conditionally successful result was achieved. The United States' 
efforts to prevent a communist takeover of the Laotian government during the period 1956-
1962 (case 56-4) is an example. Finally, a score of four indicates that policy goals were 
achieved. An example of a successful outcome is illustrated by the joint efforts of the 
United Kingdom and the United States to overthrow Idi Amin in Uganda in the late 1970's 
(case 72-1).57 
b) Contribution made by sanctions. 
A score of one indicates that sanctions had no effect or were a negative 
contributor in achieving policy goals, as illustrated United States' campaign against Noriega 
in Panama in 1988 - 1989 (case 87-1). A score oftwo indicates that sanctions had a minor 
57Ibid., 42. 
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contribution to achieving policy goals, as illustrated by the Soviet withdrawal of assistance 
from China in the 1960's (case 60-2). A score of three shows a modest contribution by 
sanctions, as illustrated by the withdrawal of Dutch and American economic aid to Suriname 
between 1982 and 1988 (case 82-2). Finally, a score of four is given to those cases where 
economic sanctions significantly contributed to achieving foreign policy goals, as illustrated 
by the United States' success in destabilizing the government of Rafael Trujillo in the 
Dominican Republic in 1960 through 1961 (case 60-1).58 
2. Variables that Influence a Sanctions Episode 
A sanctions episode is influenced by a number of variables, both domestic and 
international, which can effect the outcome of the episode. HSE identify a number of these 
underlying variables and groups them into two categories: political variables and economic 
variables. 
Political variables include companion policies (such as covert maneuvers, quasi-
military activity, and regular military activity), the duration economic sanctions were in force, 
the extent of international cooperation in imposing sanctions, presence of international 
assistance to the target country, political stability and economic health of the target country, 
and the prior relations between sender and target countries. 59 
Economic variables include the cost imposed on the target country (expressed in 




nature of commercial relations between the sender and target countries; the relative economic 
size of the countries, measured by the ratio of their GNPs; the type of sanctions used, namely, 
export, import, or financial sanctions; and the cost to the sender country.60 
3. Types of Foreign Policy Objectives 
When analyzing the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving foreign policy 
goals, "the first step is to distinguish between the types of foreign policy objectives sought in 
different sanctions episodes."61 HSE categorize foreign policy objectives into five groups: 
modest changes in the policies of the target country, destabilization of the target government, 
disruption of military adventures, impairment of military potential, and other major policy 
changes (for example, human rights goals such as ending apartheid in South Africa). HSE 
placed each of their 115 cases in one of the five foreign policy objective types. An overview 
of case success by policy goal type is shown in Table 3-2. HSE then identifies the presence 
and degree of the political and economic variables for each case. From there, they deduce the 
variables' effect on whether or not sanctions positively contributed to that particular foreign 
policy type. For example, when seeking to destabilize a government as a foreign policy 
obj~ctive, HSE has determined which variables were important in achieving the objective and 




seldom achieve destabilization" and "when relations between sender and target were cordial 
before the episode, the chances of success were greater."62 
Table 3-2. Success by tYQe of :Qolicy goal 
Success Failure Success ratio 
Policy goal cases Cases (%) 
Modest policy change 17 34 33 
Destabilization 11 10 52 
Disruption of Military 
adventures 6 12 33 
Military impairment 2 8 20 
Other major policy changes 5 15 25 
All casesa 41 79 34 
Source: HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 93. 
aFive cases are classified under two different policy goals. Since all but 
one of these cases are a failure, double-counting them adds a small 
negative bias to the success ratio. 
4. HSE's Recommendations 
HSE judged 35 of the 115 cases to be at least partially successful. From these 35 
cases, HSE determined that sanctions are most likely to be effective when the following nine 
recommendations are followed. 
(1) Don't bite off more than you can chew. Policymakers often 
overestimate what sanctions can accomplish. While the economic impact on the target 
country may be pronounced, other factors also influence the impact of sanctions in 
62Ibid .• 51. 
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determining political outcomes. HSE state that "sanctions are seldom effective in impairing 
the military potential of an important power, or in bringing about major changes in the 
policies of the target country."63 The goal needs to be relatively modest. 
(2) More is not necessarily merrier. HSE state: ''The greater number of 
countries needed to implement sanctions, the less likely it is that they will be effective."64 
When more sender countries are involved in a sanctions case, competing interests and policy 
goals arise between them. Conflict and inconsistancies among the sender countries decreases 
the effects of sanctions. HSE conclude that, in most instances, multilateral sanctions are not 
associated with success. 
This recommendation, made in 1990, may be subject to adjustment. Declining 
U.S. economic and political hegemony suggest that unilateral sanctions are ineffective (refer 
back to Table 2-1) and that because of to day's global economy, sanctions need to be 
multilateral in order to succeed. Excerpts from HSE's 3d edition seem recognize the 
importance of multilateral sanctions, indicating a reversal on their previous recommendation. 
This area will be addressed in greater detail when analyzing the FRY (S/M) case. 
(3) The weakest go to the wall. There is a direct correlation between the 




pressure. "Countries in distress or experiencing significant problems are far more likely to 
succumb to coercion by the sender country."65 
(4) Attack your allies, not your adversaries. When the sender and the 
target are friendly toward each other and conduct substantial trade with each other prior to the 
imposition of sanctions they are more likely to succeed. "Economic sanctions seem most 
effective when aimed against erstwhile friends and close trading partners."66 
(5) Sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively. Sanctions that are 
imposed slowly or incrementally allow time for the target country find ways to circumvent 
the sanctions regime. Further, slow-going sanctions "may strengthen the target government 
at home as it marshals the forces of nationalism."67 
(6) Inflict heavy costs on the target country. Cases in which the target 
country experiences heavy economic costs are generally successful. "The average cost to the 
target for all successful cases was 2.4 percent of GNP; by contrast, failed episodes barely 
dented the economy of the target country, with costs averaging only 1.0 percent ofGNP."68 
(7) The sender avoids high costs to itself. The greater the cost to the sender, 
the 1ess likely it is that sanctions will succeed. In most of the cases, the cost to the sender is 
insignificant. In fact, a short-term net gain is achieved as foreign aid and credits are cut off. 
65Ibid., 96. 
66Ibid., 99. 
67 Ibid., 100. 
68 Ibid., 101. 
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Additionally, financial sanctions are less costly to the sender than trade sanctions. The use of 
financial coercion - manipulation of economic aid, denying official credits, or freezing assets 
- allows the target country to conduct limited trade, albeit at somewhat lower levels. The 
cost of financial sanctions are incurred by the target's businesses and trading houses and not 
by the sender. Further, existing contracts between the target and sender countries are less 
likely to be effected than if retroactive trade sanctions were applied. Finally, fmancial 
sanctions may be directly focused on the assets and finances of the target country's 
leadership, thereby transfering the costs of the sanctions episode to those responsible for the 
respective conflict. 
(8) Choose the right tool for the job. Economic sanctions are often 
employed along with other coercive measures against the target, such as covert action, quasi-
military measures, or regular military operations. Companion measures are used most 
effectively in cases where the foreign policy goal is to destabilize the target or impair its 
military potential. Companion measures were used least in cases seeking modest policy 
changes. 
This recommendation is also problematic, as it is difficult to judge which 
policy tool - sanctions or the military force - influenced the attainment of foreign policy 
goals more. This issue will be addressed in the following chapter as well. 
(9) Look before you leap. The sender must avoid knee-jerk reactions to a 
foreign policy crisis, if a sanctions episode is to be successful. In fact, sanctions may not be 
an appropriate response to a crisis. "Sender governments should think through their means 
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and objectives before taking a final decision to deploy sanctions."69 Sanctions chosen must 
be appropriate to the situation and tailored to the objectives. Sanctions are described as a 
blunt instrument, or using a military term, they cause extensive collateral damage. The 
unintended effects of sanctions are many, including hurting children and the elderly or, to use 
a military term again, non-combatants. 
5. Criticisms of HSE's study 
In addition to the defininitional criticisms of HSE, there are a number of other 
criticisms over HSE's methodology and analysis.7o Some of the critics, like van Bergeijk, 
discount HSE' s findings, while others, like Looney and Knouse, build on the framework 
established by HSE. Further, there exists a general belief that sanctions will not succeed in 
altering the foreign and military policy of the target, adding to the critics of HSE.71 Despite 
these criticisms, however, HSE's work is the "major empirical study iIi the field"72 and as 
"the only major large-N study of sanctions, the HSE database has become the bedrock study 
on the effectiveness of economic sanctions."73 The third edition to HSE's Economic 
69Ibid., 105. 
70See Shane Bonetti, "The Analysis and Interpretation of Economic Santions," Journal of Economic Studies 
24, no. 5 (1997); Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work;" Peter A. G. van Bergeijk. "The Effectivity of 
Economic Sanctions: Illusion or Reality," Peace Economic, Peace Science, and Public Policy 2, no. 1 (Fall 
1994); and Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, "Predicting the Success ofEconornic Sanctions," The 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13, no. 2 (1991). 
71 David Cortright and George A. Lopez, ''Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations," 
Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? ed. Cortright and Lopez (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1995),7. 
72Ibid. 
73Pape, ''Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." 92. Further, in Coercive Cooperation, Martin calls 
HSE's work the "invaluable data set" (p. xi). 
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Sanctions Reconsidered is due to be released in January 1999 and will include revisions to its 
original findings74; presumeably, for example, modifying its controversial recommendation 
that unilateral sanctions are more successful than multilateral sanctions. Until then, this 
thesis will utilize the "bedrock study" of HSE' s second edition. 
6. Summary 
With an overview of HSE' s methodology and findings in hand, a sketch of the 
sanctions episode on the FRY (SIM) will be provided in the following section. The next 
chapter will provide an analysis of the sanctions episode and determine what extent sanctions 
had in achieving policy goals in the former Yugoslavia. Of importance in that chapter is the 
resolution of HSE's controversial recommendations, namely the effectiveness of unilateral 
versus multilateral sanctions, determining the role of companion policies in a sanctions 
episode, and the importance of conducting an analysis of the target's economy prior to 
sanction implementation. 
B. UN SANCTIONS ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
1. UNSCR 713 - The Arms Embargo 
In response to JNA combat in Croatia, the European Community (EC) mediated a 
cease-fire on 28 June 1991. In an attempt to force compliance with the cease-fire, foreign 
ministers of the EC imposed an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and froze all EC 
[mancial aid. The United States followed suit in July 1991. In September 1991, the arms 
embargo - UNSCR 713 - was passed by the UN Security Council. To summarize 713, "the 
74Kimberly Elliott, email to the author dated 17 September 1998. 
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Council fully supports the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, and 
decides that all States immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia [all states and provinces that 
made up Yugoslavia]."75 There were no enforcement provisions in this resolution. A 
subsequent resolution, UNSCR 724, passed in December 1991, established a sanctions 
committee that was charged to monitor compliance with the arms embargo. Still without 
enforcement provisions, the committee relied on governments and customs agencies for 
enforcement and to report violations. 
The arms embargo was the most controversial resolution concerning the sanctions on 
the former Yugoslavia. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN charter prohibits the United Nations 
from intervening in a state's domestic matters. Since Croatia and Slovenia were not yet 
recognized by the United Nations, UNSCR 713 was in violation of the UN charter.76 
Interestingly enough, the Federal Government of Yugoslavia consented to the arms embargo. 
The controversies and the effects of this embargo will be addressed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
2. UNSeR 757 - Economic Sanctions 
As the fighting continued in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the UN and 
European Community (EC) tried in vain to negotiate a cease-fire. The Security Council 
75United Nations, "The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia" [on-line] (New York: 
UN Department of Publication, 30 April 1995, accessed 21 April 1998), available from 
http://gopher.undp.org.lunearthlpko/dpi1312.r4; Internet, 10 of 307. 
76At that time, Germany was the only country to recognize these two nations. 
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determined the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted a threat to world peace and on 30 
May 1992 issued UNSCR 757 which implemented economic sanctions against the FRY 
(SIM). "The Council condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take effective measures to fulftll the requirements of 
resolution 752 [UNSCR 752 calls for all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to cease hostilities 
and for outside states to end their support to the warring factions], and decides to impose 
comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that country."77 These sanctions included 
blocking all assets and prohibiting imports and exports of all commodities and products, 
except for certain humanitarian items, such as medical supplies and foodstuffs. 
UNSCR 757's intent was to provide a comprehensive sanctions regime on FRY 
(SIM), however, one large loophole existed. The Resolution allowed temporary entry into 
Serbia and Montenegro, for transshipment purposes to a third country, of goods not 
originating in these provinces. Once the goods entered it was difficult to ensure they did not 
remain there. Further, forged certificates of origin made it difficult to ensure goods did not 
originate from Serbia and Montenegro. 
UNSCR 757 was directed solely at the FRY (SIM). This is the first indication that the 
Serbs were officially identified as the primary antagonists in the conflict and targeted as such. 
"In reporting to Congress, President Bush blamed Serbia and Montenegro for 'their 
involvement in a support for groups attempting to seize territory in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina by force and violence, utilizing in part the forces of the so-called Yugoslav 
77United Nations, "Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," 17 of 307. 
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National Army. '''78 However, this indicates another weakness of the Resolution; it did not 
target FRY (SIM)'s proxies in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, the Bosnian Serbs 
and Croatian Serbs (in the Krajina region), who were directly participating in the war, were 
not targeted by sanctions as the United States and the European Union countries concluded 
the FRY (SIM) was solely responsible for the conflict. 
Finally, there were no enforcement provisions in UNSCR 757. On 10 July 1992, the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of the Western European Union (WEU) established the WEU 
monitoring operation in the Adriatic Sea. NATO followed suit on 15 July 1992 and 
undertook its own monitoring operation in the Adriatic. The WEU operation was codenamed 
"Sharp Vigilance" and operated in the Straits of Otranto, while the NATO operation was 
codenamed "Maritime Monitor" and operated off the coast of Montenegro.79 These 
operations were only authorized to monitor shipping in the area. Enforcement of 757 and 
I 
713 was not allowed. 
3. UNSeR 787 - Enforcing the Sanctions 
Violations of the embargo continued through Montenegrin ports on the Adriatic and 
through ship and barge traffic on the Danube River. On 16 November 1992 UNSCR 787 was 
passed in response to these violations. This resolution calls for maritime interception 
operations to enforce Resolutions 713 and 757. To summarize Resolution 787: 
78Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. Bush 1992 - vo1.lI (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1993), quoted in Hull, Imposing International Sanctions, Internet. 
79See the Annex for more detail and information on the maritime role in sanctions monitoring and 
enforcement. . 
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The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decides to prohibit the 
transshipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
of certain products unless such transshipment is specifically authorized, and that any 
vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in 
or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall 
be considered a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails. The Council calls 
upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use 
such measures as may be necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping 
in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict 
implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992).80 
The elimination of transshipments included strategic commodities such as oil, natural gas, 
tires, and vehicles. The Sanctions Committee would authorize exceptions on a case-by-case 
basis. 
In order to implement this resolution, NATO and WEU adopted rules of engagement 
for their squadrons. These rules authorized the maritime forces to intercept and board all 
inbound and outbound shipments destined to or originating from Montenegrin ports. Along 
, 
the Danube River, Romanian and Bulgarian customs officials primarily carried out the 
enforcement. 
4. UNSCR 820 - Closing the Loopholes 
UNSCR 820, implemented in April 1993, tightened the embargo on the FRY (S/M). 
The implementation of this resolution was in response to the Bosnian Serbs' failure to 
endorse the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. 
The Council commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, welcomes the 
fact that the plan had been accepted in full by two of the Bosnian parties and calls on 
the Bosnian Serb party to accept the peace plan in full. It decides to strengthen the 
sanctions regime imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
80united Nations, "Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," 119 of 307. 
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Montenegro) effective nine days after the date of adoption of the resolution, unless the 
Bosnian Serb party signs the peace plan and cease their military attacks in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 81 
This resolution focuses on the enforcement of the embargo. The seizure and 
confiscation of goods and vessels found in violation were now authorized. Further, 
transshipments through FRY (SIM) territory and along the Danube River were prohibited, 
unless approved by the Sanctions Committee. Enforcement measures along the Danube were 
also strengthened. 
C. FINANCIAL SANCTIONS - "THE OUTER WALL" 
Despite the lifting of UN sanctions against the FRY (SIM) in 1996, an informal "outer 
wall" of sanctions remains in place. This "outer wall" of sanctions exists to prohibit FRY 
(SIM) from receiving fmancing from international financial institutions and the U.S. 
Government. The United States has helped block the membership of FRY (SIM) in 
institutions such as the W orId Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. Without membership, the FRY (SIM) cannot apply for 
loans from these institutions, cutting it off from key sources of financing for major 
infrastructure improvements, re-capitalization programs, and private sector development 
projects. In addition, U.S. Government financing institutions such as the Trade and 
Development Agency, U.S. Export-Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation provide no coverage for projects involving the FRY (SIM). 
81 United Nations, "Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," 121 of 307. 
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The United States withdrew FRY (SIM),s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status 
on 16 October 1992 for failure to comply with provisions of the Helsinki Final Act; 
particularly those concerning human rights and humanitarian affairs, and failing to respect the 
rights of minority groups. Duty rates applied to imports from the FRY (SIM) and U.S. 
exports to the FRY (SIM) do not enjoy MFN status and are thus subject to the highest 
possible tariff allowable. The "outer wall" has remained in place to be used as leverage in 
the diplomatic effort to ensure FRY (SIM) compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord. In 
addition, the situation in Kosovo is being tied to these financial sanctions. Recent articles 
about financial sanctions state that they were the most influential sanctions tool in the FRY 
(SIM) case and are being looked upon to improve sanctions strategy. These issues will also 
be addressed in the following chapter. 
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IV. MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS 
Economic sanctions were the mainstay of U.S., UN, and European policy toward the 
former Yugoslavia from 1991 through 1998. Even before the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 
1991, the U.S. Congress threatened the country with sanctions to protest Serbian human 
rights violations of ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo province. At the time of this writing, 
sanctions and the use of force are being threatened over Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. As 
such, economic sanctions have been the coercive foreign policy tool of choice for the region. 
Sanctions against the former Yugoslavia began in 1991 in response to the crisis over 
Slovenian and Croatian secession. When the war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the 
Serbs were labeled as the aggressors and sanctions were placed on the FRY (S/M). These 
sanctions were strengthened in 1993 by two UN Security Council Resolutions: UNSCR 787 
that called for the use of force to enforce the sanctions and UNSCR 820 that closed loopholes 
found in the existing sanction regime. Finally, in 1994 the UN Security Council extended 
the existing sanctions to cover Serbian-held territory in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(UNSCR 942). 
The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995 ended the armed conflict 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its various provisions set out to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
a multi-ethnic state. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the influence of sanctions in 
ending the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of the Dayton Accord. In 
doing so, this chapter will first determine what the sender countries' foreign policy objectives 
were. Next, an explanation of the political and economic variables will be provided and 
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finally, a summary of David Owen's and Richard Holbrooke's diplomatic efforts will be 
offered, concentrating on how they used sanctions as a tool of coersion against the FRY 
(SIM). 
In analyzing a sanctions episode, the first step is to identify the type of foreign policy 
objective sought by the sender country. HSE identify five major groups of foreign policy 
objectives: "modest changes in policy, destabilization of the target government, disruption of 
military adventures, impairment of military potential, and other major policy changes."82 
The first section of this chapter will identify what type of foreign policy objective was sought 
in the former Yugoslavia case. Statements from U.S. and European political leaders, as well 
as the UN Security Council Resolutions, will provide insight to the specific objective being 
sought. 
Beside the type of policy objective being sought, there are a number of underlying 
factors, or variables, that may influence the outcome of a sanctions episode. HSE has divided 
these variables into two groupings, political variables and economic variables. Political 
variables consist of the existance of companion policies (covert maneuvers, quasi-military 
activity, and regular military activity), the number of years economic sanctions were in force, 
the extent of international cooperation in imposing sanctions, the presence of international 
assistance to the target country, political and economic stability of the target country, and the 
warmth of prior relations between the sender and target countries. Economic variables 
include-the cost imposed on the target country (expressed in absolute terms, in per capita 
82HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 49. 
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terms, and as a percentage of the target's gross national product [GNP]), commercial 
relations between sender and target countries, relative economic size of the countries, type of 
sanctions used (import, export, and [mancial), and the cost to the sender countIy.83 
The next section of this chapter will frame its analysis around the important variables 
that influence a sanctions episode using evidence drawn from numerous sources, such as UN, 
NATO, and official documents; the diplomatic efforts of Lord David Owen and Richard 
Holbrooke; financial analysis from the W orId Bank and International Monetary Fund; and 
newspapers and journals. 
A. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
Developing a consistant, unitary policy towards the former Yugoslavia was a difficult 
task for the United Nations Security Council, European states, and the United States. 
Historically, the ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia each had their own overseas 
supporters or allies. For example, France and the Russia have historical ties to the Serbians84 
while Germany has ties to the Croatians and Slovenes. The United Kingdom and the United 
States, having weak links to these ethnic groups, eventually sided with the Bosnian-Muslims. 
The potential implications of this situation were particularily grave, as the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia potentially had NATO members and the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council on opposing sides in the Balkan conflict. This drawing of sides made it 
83Ibid., 40. 
84Por evidence ofPrench-Serbian collaboration, see R. Jeffrey Smith, "Secret Meetings Killed Karadzic 
Capture Plan," Washington Post, 23 April 1998, l(A) and "Serbs Were Given NATO Targets," Times 
Newspapers (London), 03 November 1998. 
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difficult to obtain a consensus on the formulation and implementation of a policy towards the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Within the United States, establishing policy towards the former Yugoslavia was also 
difficult. By the late 1980s, the United States' position on the former Yugoslavia was to 
support unity and democracy in that country. With the marked rise in nationalism that 
followed the 1990 federal election in the former Yugoslavia, these goals were antithetical. 
This election placed nationalist leaders in the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, with 
the Slovene and Croat presidents espousing independence.85 Warren Zimmerman, the last 
U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1989-1992), explains the contradictions in U.S. policy 
towards the former Yugoslavia: "If unity was sacrificed on the altar of Slovenian or Croatian 
democratic self-determination, war would result, and democracy, as well as unity would 
suffer. Conversely, if the Yugoslav army and Milosevic tried to hold ~e country together by 
force, there would be armed resistance from Slovenia and Croatia, and both democracy and 
unity would be sacrificed."86 
As war descended upon the former Yugoslavia, the goal for unity was abandoned. In 
its place, the United States and the Europeans championed self determination and sought to 
blame the Serbs for its aggression in the former Yugoslav republics. As former U.S. 
Ambassador Zimmerman noted, ''Throughout the spring [1992], Washington had instructed 
85Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Franjo Tudjrnan in Croatia, and Milan Kucan in Slovenia. This election left 
the Yugoslav government, led by Prime Minister Ante Markovic, weak and ineffective. 
86Warren Zimmerman, U.S. and Russian Policy Making with Respect to the Use of Force [book on-line], ed. 
Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996, accessed 07 April 1998); 
available from http://www.rand.orglpublicationsICF/CF129; Internet. 
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me to warn Milosevic that, if war came, we would assign major blame to him; Serbia would 
be isolated, a pariah. "87 The arms embargo and economic sanctions were the means for the 
sender countries to isolate and punish Serbia [FRY (SIM)] for its role as aggressor in the 
former Yugoslav republics. 
Once the sanctions regime was in place against the FRY (SIM), the use of it as a tool 
of coersion was inconsistant between the United States and the European states. The United 
States sought to demonize Milosevic, just as it had done against Saddam Hussein during the 
Gulf War. The European states, on the other hand, viewed Milosevic as a pragmatist who 
could be bargained with.88 This led to yet another contradiction. While the Europeans used 
sanctions in a "carrot and stick" manner, rewarding him for concessions made during 
negotiations, the United States found it difficult to reward a demonized leader. Utilizing the 
sanctions regime as leverage during negotiations will be addressed in more detail in the last 
section of this chapter. 
The sender countries' policy goals towards the former Yugoslavia evolved over time 
as the crisis took on new facets. As such, so did the use of sanctions in achieving those 
goals. Conflicts and competing interests between the sender countries, however, played a 
major obstacle in defining clear cut policy goals as well as a sanctions strategy for the former 
Yugoslavia. Once defined, however, sanctions provided the sender countries substantial 
leverage against the FRY (SIM) in forcing a negotiated settlement and ending the conflict. 
87Ibid. 
880wen, Balkan Odyssey, 124-125. 
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The following sections will define the policy goals sought by the sender countries through the 
arms embargo and economic sanctions. 
1. UNSeR 713 - Arms Embargo 
The European Community initiated an arms embargo in June 1991 and the United 
States followed suit the following month. At the onset of the conflict, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) attempted to restore peace and dialogue in 
Yugos1avia.89 The United Nations became actively involved in the crisis in Yugoslavia on 
25 September 1991 when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713. "By its 
resolution, the [UN Security] Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance in 
consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts."90 
This resolution expressed deep concern at the fighting in that country and called on all 
members to implement immediately a complete embargo on the deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia. The United Nations' goal was to stop the fighting in 
Yugoslavia by limiting the amount of arms entering the region and to undertake diplomatic 
efforts to stop the fighting. This theory had two major problems. First, the abundant 
stockpiles of weapons available throughout the fonner Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (as mentioned in Chapter ll), allowed the warring factions to continue the 
conflict for years without the need for imports of arms and ammunition. Second, the debate 
8~OW known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE. 
90united Nations, "Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," 53 of 307. 
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that arose over the legality of the resolution considering that Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were recognized by the United Nations. 
UNSCR 713 was imposed on the still intact Yugoslavia in September 1991; the 
United Nations had yet to recognize the breakaway republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations recognized these countries in May 1992, however, 
the arms embargo remained in place on the entire former Yugoslavia. Opponents of the arms 
embargo point to Article of 51 of the UN Charter, which allows a state the use force to 
defend itself against outside aggression.91 The arms embargo prevented these newly formed 
states, recognized by the United Nations, from defending themselves against Serbian 
aggression. While the Slovenes and Croats were prepared for conflict with the JNA, the 
army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was totally unprepared for war. When war broke out there in 
March 1992, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked the heavy weap~ns to counter the JNA 
and BSA's tanks and heavy artillery, resulting in tremendous losses in both territory and 
lives. Despite the fact that the Serbs were labeled as the aggressors in the conflict, Bosnia-
Herzegovina was unable to purchase the requisite armaments necessary for its defense.92 As 
such, the legal and moral debate continues over UNSCR 713. 
In terms of HSE, the sender countries' primary foreign policy goal was to "impair the 
military potential of the target country" through the arms embargo. UNSCR 713 would deny 
91Lois Fielding, Maritime Interception and UN Sanctions: Resolving Issues in the Persian Gulf War, the 
Conflict in the Former Yugsolavia, and the Haiti Crisis, (San Francisco: Austin and Winfield, 1997), 43. 
92Covert arms shipments, primarily small arms and ammunition, were eventually delivered to the army of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This issue will be addressed in the "Political Variables" section of this chapter. 
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the warring factions war-making material and force them to a negotiated settlement. HSE 
comment on this type of policy goal: "Attempts to impair the military power of an adversary 
usually encompass an explicit or implicit goal - however elusive - of destabilizing the target 
country's government."93 When UNSCR 713 was implemented, this corollary was not the 
case for the former Yugoslavia as the United States and the European states wanted a 
negotiated settlement that would fulfill the dual goals of unity and democracy. Once the war 
started, however, the corollary did apply to Milosevic's FRY (SIM). 
In the short term, UNSCR 713 had minimal effect on the ability of the warring 
factions to carry out armed conflict, and thus was ineffective in ending the conflict. 
However, there are often unintended consequenses from the use of such foreign policy tools. 
The following will describe some of these unintended consequences that indicate that the 
arms embargo was an important part of the overall effort to bring about peace in the region. 
a) Unintended Consequences of the Arms Embargo 
David Owen, Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), was charged with negotiating a peaceful 
settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his book, Balkan Odyssey, he refutes the arguments 
that claim the arms embargo was illegal and immoral by identifying three positive results 
from the arms embargo, all of which were unintended. The intent of the arms embargo was 
to diminish the fighting in the former Yugoslavia by limiting the supply of arms to the region. 
As mentioned before, this policy goal resulted in failure. Owen, however, counters this fact 
93HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 39. 
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by stating that the unintended consequences, or the ends, justified the means; that although 
the arms embargo failed in its intent, there were positive outcomes from it. 
Owen's first point is that the arms embargo saved lives. The conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina created a grave humitarian crisis. When international relief efforts were 
targeted by the Bosnian Serbs, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 758 (1992) which 
deployed military observers (UN Protection Force or UNPROFOR) to Sarajevo to supervise 
the withdrawl of BSA anti-aircraft weapons. Their mission facilitated the safe delivery of 
relief supplies to the Sarajevo airport. UNPROFOR's mission eventually was expanded to 
protect relief convoys delivering aid throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina worsened, the United States advocated 
a "lift and strike" policy. This policy specified the lifting of the arms embargo in order to 
supply the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina with heavy weapons. NATO air strikes would be 
conducted against BSA positions to prevent a pre-emptive strike by the BSA while the mass 
influx of weapons were being delivered to the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy met 
strong opposition from the European states, as they provided the troops for the UNPROFOR 
contingent. The Europeans believed that NATO airstrikes would effect the neutral status of 
their lightly armed troops, effectively making them a target for the BSA. Thus, they 
threatened to pull the UNPROFOR contingent out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lifting the arms 
embargo without the airs trikes would also escalate the conflict by provoking the BSA to 
conduct an all out offensive prior to the delivery of weapons to the army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In effect, the arms embargo prevented the United States from taking more 
aggressive actions and thereby escalating the war. Owen concludes: "Living with the arms 
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embargo, for all its inconsistancies and evasions, was never an immoral position for it 
ensured the continuation of UNPROFOR' s humanitarian mandate for the first few years, 
when it saved hundreds of thousands of lives."94 
Secondly, the arms embargo prevented permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, not to mention NATO members, from openly supplying different sides of 
the dispute with arms. The covert supply of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina was a "pragmatic 
relaxation" of the embargo, and yet, still prevented an open confrontation between 
members.95 
Finally, the arms embargo prevented high-tech weapons from entering the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This conflict was fought primarily with World War II and 
1950's vintage equipment (for example, the BSA's T-34 and T-54/55 tanks, respectively). 
More advanced weapons mean an increase in lethality and the arms embargo prevented this. 
2. Economic Sanctions - UNSeR 757, 787, and 820 
UNSCR 757 initiated the economic sanctions regime against the FRY (SIM) in 
response to Serbian transgressions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The Council condemns the 
failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to 
take effective measures to fulfill the requirements of resolution 752 [calls for all parties in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to cease hostilities and for outside states to end their support to the 
940wen, Balkan Odyssey, 382. 
95'The Russian government in comparison by and large maintained the arms embargo against the Serbs." 
However, Russian generals, operating on the black market, did deliver spare parts to the Serbs and Croats. Ibid., 
383. 
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warring factions], and decides to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that 
country."96 
The key demands of this resolution are five-fold. First, it requires that all parties 
cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about urgently a negotiated 
political solution to the conflict in Bosnia. Second, during such negotiations, all sides must 
respect the principle that any change in the borders by force is not acceptable. Third, that all 
forms of interference from outside Bosnia-Herzegovina cease immediately. This specifically 
addresses the withdrawl of JNA and Croatian Army units deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Fourth, to recognize and respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovia. Finally, that 
all irregular forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina be disbanded and disarmed. This includes not 
only Serbian paramilitary units, such as Arkan's Tigers, but the mujahideen units operating 
with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.97 UNSCR 787 established the maritime enforcement 
ofUNSCR 713 and 757 in the Adriatic Sea and on the Danube River. This resolution also 
re-emphasizes the policy goals found in UNSCR 713 and 757. 
UNSCR 820 closed the loopholes in UNSCR 757, which included tightening the 
fininacial sanctions on FRY (S/M). Further, it strengthened enforcement measures in the 
Adriatic Sea and on the Danube River. This resolution reaffirmed the original goals stated in 
UNSCR 757, however, with one important difference; UNSeR 820 was specifically tied to 
the peace negotiations. This resolution was passed in response to the Bosnian-Serb failure to 
96United Nations, "Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," 6 of 307. 
97Ibid., 128 of 307. 
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sign the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Interestingly enough, this resolution was not targeted 
against the Bosnian Serbs for their lack of compliance. Rather, it was directed solely at 
Milosevic's FRY (SIM). 
During the previous negotiations, from the outbreak of hostilities to the failed Vance-
Owen Peace Plan, the one stumbling block was a Bosnian-Serb endorsement to any given 
peace plan. Thus, the tactic of the European negotiators, and later the U.S. negotiation team 
led by Richard Holbrooke, was to force Milosevic to not only represent the FRY (SIM), but 
the Bosnian Serbs as well. This tactic of "splitting the Serbs" circumvented the ultra-
nationalist Bosnian-Serb leadership (Radovan Karadzic and BSA General Ratko Mladic), 
thereby eliminating them as a blocking force to any future peace proposals. David Owen 
states: "I had no doubt then, and have never doubted since, that it was the prospect of 
financial sanctions which Milosevic most feared: the chance of avoiding any further 
economic misery was too attractive domestically for him to go on humoring Karadzic as he 
obstructed virtually any deal."98 
Getting Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs ran counter to a major 
FRY (SIM) policy goal; that being a Greater Serbia. Milosevic rose to power on a nationalist 
platform. Once it became evident that the former Yugoslavia would break apart, Milosevic 
espoused the policy of uniting all the Serbs under the FRY (SIM) umbrella of a "Greater 
Serbia." If the west wanted to "split the Serbs" and have Milosevic sign a peace accord that 
included UN Security Council Resolution goals, then the west had to force Milosevic to 
980wen, Balkan Odyssey, 153. 
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abandon the "Greater Serbia" concept. Owen states that sanctions had an effect in forcing 
Milosevic to abandon this ideal: "From this point, 25 April 1993, onwards Milosevic 
fOImally gave up Greater Serbia and argued for a settlement on teImS a majority in the 
Security Council could have accepted, and throughout the next two years he did not waver in 
seeking such a solution."99 
3. Summary of the Political Goals of Sanctions 
The political goal of the arms embargo was to impair the military potential of the 
target country (the fOImer Yugoslavia). The basis for this method was the belief that if 
armaments were prevented from entering the fOImer Yugoslavia, the warring factions would 
run out of the equipment needed to conduct war. The political goal for the economic 
sanctions was to change the target country's policy in a major way, that being to change 
Milosevic's goal of a greater Serbia under the FRY (SIM). Within this main goal consists 
the complementary goals of disrupting a minor military adventure, impairing the military 
potential of the target country, and, especially for the United States, to destabilize the target 
government. As HSE point out, a sanctions episode may have more than one objective. In 
these instances, HSE state, "such cases are classified according to the most difficult 
objective."lOO As such, this case is classified as one of changing the target country's policy in 
a major way. 
99Ibid. 
lO°HsE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 38. 
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B. VARIABLES AND OUTCOMES 
HSE identify nine variables that may influence the outcome of a sanctions episode. 
These variable have been grouped into two categories, political and economic. The political 
variables include: companion policies used by the sender, the number of years economic 
sanctions were in force, the extent of international cooperation in imposing sanctions, the 
presence of international assistance to the target country, the political stability and economic 
health of the target country, and the warmth of prior relations between the sender and target 
countries. The economic variables include: the cost imposed on the target country, the 
commercial relations between sender and target countries, the relative economic size of the 
sender and target countries, the type of economic sanctions used (export, import, and/or 
financial), and the cost to the sender country. This section will identify these variables in 
order to determine how the variables effected the sanctions episode. 
1. Political Variables 
a) Companion Policies 
HSE classify companion policy measures into three types, covert action, 
quasi-military action, and regular military action. Companion policies such as these are often 
invoked when the policy goal is to destabilize the target government or to exhort a major 
policy change from the target country.101 All three types of companion policies were present 
during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
lOlIbid., 43. 
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Covert action is defined as "the attempt by a government or group to influence 
events in another state or territory without revealing its own involvement. Seeking to 
influence others is, of course, the stuff of politics and foreign policy." 102 Due to the nature 
of covert action, it is impossible to identify every action. Evidence does exist, however, of 
the covert re-supply and training of the Croatian Anny and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
By 1995, both policies had an important effect in changing the balance on the 
battlefield, allowing the Croatian army defeat the Croatian-Serbs and the army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Croat army re-gain territory lost to the Bosnian Serbs. Of arms 
shipments delivered to Croatia, David Owen notes: "By late 1992 the arms embargo was 
barely touching Croatia, and though the FRY (SIM) sent details of arms coming in to the 
Security Council, nothing was done to halt the supplies. Soon the Croatian army was being 
equipped with planes, tanks and heavy artillery, most of it coming in from surrounding 
European countries having been bought in what was East Germany."103 The Bosnian-
Muslims (army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) were also receiving covert arms shipments. Noted 
Richard Holbrooke, in a 13 January 1993 memorandum to Warren Christopher and Tony 
Lake: 
An important reason the Bosnian Muslims are surviving is that they are beginning to 
get significant weapons shipments from Islamic nations, apparently including Iran. 
These are coming through Croatia, with Croatian complicity .... Four key points 
about these no-so-secret shipments to the Muslims: 
l02Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Washington D.C.: Brassey's, 1995),3. 
1030wen, Balkan Odyssey, 74. Owen goes on to state that the Germans "turned more than a blind eye to 
arms sales to Croatia," p. 203. 
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- first, the Croats, who do not want to let the Muslims become too strong, 
have not allowed them to include heavy weapons or artillery; 
- second, every weapons shipments has a Coatian "weapons tax"; that is, the 
Croats siphon off some of the weapons for their own army and for the HVO 
[the Bosnian Croat Army] in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
- third, there is now strong evidence that small but growing numbers of 
"freedom fighters" or mujahideen are joining the Bosnian forces, although, as 
one might expect, the strict fundamentalists from the Mideast and the loose, 
secular Muslims of Bosnia do not understand each other or mix well; 
- finally, these shipments will continue - and they will increase.104 
Further, according to Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, in his 23 May 1996 
testimony before the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence, arms shipments to the Bosnian-
Muslims from Iran had taken place since 1992.105 Finally, former U.S. military personnel, 
employed by Military Professional Resources Inc. of Alexandria, Virginia with the blessing 
of the U.S. State Department, were hired to assist the Croatian Army.106 
The purposes of these covert actions were to tilt the military balance against 
the Serbs in favor of the Croatians and Muslims. These efforts culminated in the Croatian 
offensive in August 1995, which retook the Krajina region from the Croatian Serbs,107 and 
the Bosnian Federation (Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats) offensive against the BSA in 
104Richard Holbrooke memorandum to Warren Christopher and Tony Lake, 1LS, 13 January 1993, quoted 
in Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998),50-51. 
105Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Clinton Adminisiration and Anns shipments from Iran to 
Bosnia, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 23 May 1996. 
106lo,uis Salome, "Ex-U.S. Military Officers Assist Croat Army [on line]," Cox News Service, n.d" accessed 
27 April 1998; available from http://www.milnet.comlmilnetlcroat.htm; Internet. 
107This was the first time in four years the Serbs had suffered a military setback. 
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September 1995, which retook territory lost earlier to the Bosnian Serbs. Richard Holbrooke, 
utilizing Federation successes on the battlefield, delayed obtaining a ceasefire in order to 
allow the Federation greater leverage at the Dayton Peace Talks.108 
According to HSE, examples of quasi-military activity include the stationing 
naval vessels off shore and the massing of troops at the border. The conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina experienced naval vessels off the FRY (SIM) coast and, while not the massing 
of troops at the border, the massing of air power overhead. The Western European Union 
established a naval presence in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992, monitoring compliance with 
UNSCRs 713 and 757. UNSCR 787 established the maritime interception operation, named 
Operation SHARP GUARD, in the Adriatic, as well as on the Danube River. The maritime 
forces that were involved in SHARP GUARD positioned its forces in the Straits of Otranto 
and off the coast of Montenegro (see Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of the 
maritime intereception operation). Operation DENY FLIGHT massed NATO airpower over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with UNSCR 781 (October 1992).109 This action also 
limited the combat capabilities of the BSA, as they were now unable to rely on tactical 
aviation to provide close air support or helicopters for troop transport. Finally, this massing 
of airpower overhead carried with it the inherent threat of airstrikes. Threats of airstikes were 
often used by NATO and the United Nations to coerce the Bosnian Serbs into compliance 
l08Holbrooke, To End a War, 148. 
109UNSCR 781 establishes the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina. This resolution prohibited all fixed 
and rotary wing aircraft of the warring factions from conducting operations. This resolution was directed at the 
Bosnian-Serbs, as they were the only warring faction to have a tactical, fixed-wing airforce. 
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with any number of demands. Sometimes, these threats were carried out, as mentioned in the 
next paragraph. 
The third type of companion policy is regular military activity. There are three 
examples of regular military activity in the Bosnian conflict: NATO air strikes, the Croatian 
offensive, and the Federation offensive. NATO undertook ten airstrikes during the conflict 
phase in Bosnia, the first one on 28 February 1994 (NATO's first military strike in its 45 year 
history) and the last in September-October 1995 (NATO's largest military strike), all of 
which were against the Bosnian Serbs. While the Croatian and Muslims were not sender 
countries in the sanctions episode on the FRY (S/M), their ground campaigns were integral in 
obtaining leverage against the Bosnian Serbs that was utilized in the Dayton Peace 
Negotiations. Further, because of U.S. and European acquiescence, if not outright support, to 
the arms shipments to the Croats and Muslims, by extention then, the ground campaign 
against the Bosnian Serbs may be considered a companion policy of the sender countries. 
NATO's last and largest airstrike occurred almost simultaneously with the 
Federation's final offensive, in fact Milosevic accused NATO of providing close air support 
to the Federation offensive. IIO Opponents of sanctions point to these military acts, and not 
sanctions, as the reason why the Dayton Peace Accord was signed. 
While the NATO strikes and the Federation offensive dramatically changed 
the course of the war, sanctions still had a major role in forcing Milosevic to end his "Greater 
Serbia" policy. As mentioned earlier, Milosevic had signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 
llOHolbrooke, To End a War, 147. 
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return for the lifting of economic sanctions.lll This occurred in April 1993, over two years 
prior to the largest NATO airstrike and the Federation offensive. In short, economic 
sanctions delivered Milosevic to the peace table, not airstrikes. The question, then, is 
whether economic sanctions would have brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table. 
Owen believes that given more time and a consistant U.S. policy, they would 
have. UNSCR 820 was passed to tighten sanctions on the FRY (S/M). Transshipments 
through the FRY (SIM) were prohibited and monitors were placed on FRY (S/M) border 
crossings, however, Clinton vacillated over his Balkan Policy (specifically, over his promise 
to send U.S. ground troops to enforce the VOPP) and thus, undelIDined the VOPP and 
weakened the policy goal UNSCR 820 sought to achieve. This resulted in the abandonment 
of the VOPP and with it, two more years of fighting. In short, according to Owen, given 
more time and a consistent U.S. policy, UNSCR 820 might have forced the Bosnian Serbs to 
sign the VOPP.112 
b) Duration 
HSE state: "The life of a sanctions episode is not often defined with the 
precision of a college matriculation and graduation. In the early phases, the sender country 
[or countries] may take pains to conceal and even deny that it is imposing sanctions."113 
HSE identify the duration of successful cases to be 2.9 years and 8.0 years for failure cases. 
1110wen, Balkan Odyssey, 153. 
1I20wen, Balkan Odyssey, 160-197. Owen is very critical of Clinton'S foreign policy in the Balkans. 
Chapter Four of his book offers an insightful commentary on the U.S. derailment of the VOPP. 
1I3HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 43. 
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For this paper, the start of the sanctions episode begins with the date the Security Council 
Resolution was passed and the end, the tennination date as specified by the Security Council. 
UNSCR 713, the anns embargo, was in effect from 25 September 1991 until 
18 June 1996, approximately four years, nine months. UNSCR 757 began on 30 May 1992 
and UNSCR 820 began on 17 Apri11993. Both ended on 22 November 1995, byUNSCR 
1022. Sanctions, however, remained in place on the Bosnian Serbs as a measure to ensure 
compliance with certain provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord. The duration of the 
sanctions were three and a half years for UNSCR 757 and two years and seven months for 
820.114 
c) International Cooperation 
HSE index the extent of cooperation into four categories: no cooperation, 
minor cooperation, modest cooperation, and significant cooperation. No cooperation is 
typified when a single sender country imposes sanctions with no outside cooperation. Mi~or 
cooperation is defined when the sender country enlists verbal support and possibly token 
restraints from other countries. Modest cooperation exists when the sender country obtains 
meaningful restraints ....:. but limited in time and coverage - from some but not all the 
important trading partners of the target country. Finally, significant cooperation exists when 
114United Nations, Security Council, Repon of the Copenhagen Round Table on United Nations Sanctions 
in the Case of the Former Yugoslavia, 24 Septemer 1996. 
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the important trading partners make a major effort to limit trade, although leakages may still 
exist through neutral countries.115 
"Significant cooperation" existed during the sanctions episode against the 
FRY (SIM). Not only did the FRY (SIM),s former trading partners make a major effort to 
limit trade, but they also contributed assets to enforce the sanctions. Further, international 
agencies were involved and various sanctions commissions were set up to oversee the 
sanctions regime. The UN Security Council's report on UN sanctions against the FRY (SIM) 
state, ''This unprecedented formula of a coordinated, inter-institutional, international 
cooperative effort to assist States in their observance of mandatory economic 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council may have been a decisive factor in making these 
measures a valuable and effective policy instrument in the graduated response to threats to 
international peace and security in this case."116 Implementation by the states was supported 
by the OSCE, with active intergovernmental support from the European Union (EU), 
Western Eurpoean Union (WEU), NATO, and the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY). The United States alone contributed 50 civilian monitors to the 220-
H5HSE, Economic Sanctions ReconSidered, 44. 
116United Nations, Copenhagen Round Table on UN Sanctions, 3. 
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person international monitoring mission along the FRY (SIM) - Bosnia border, which was 
run by the ICFY.1 17 
This international cooperation evolved from the recommendations made by 
several fact finding missions to the region. These missions, started in the summer of 1992, 
were conducted by customs officials from the United States and member countries of the 
European Community (precursor to the.European Union). These missions "laid the 
foundations of international cooperation in support of the implementation of these 
sanctions."118 Implementation was carried out by the Sanctions Assistance Missions 
(SAMs), located in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The SAM Communications Center 
(SAMCOMM) was located in Brussels. The SAM teams consisted of customs officials from 
the EC states (later, the EU) and were provided with communications equipment to 
coordinate their efforts. Additional SAMs were eventually added in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Croatia, and the Ukraine.119 
117U.S. Department of State, Bosnia Fact Sheet: Economic Sanctions Against the FRY (SIM) (13 November 
1995) [on line), n.p., accessed 09 April 1998; available from 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eurlbosnialyugoslavia_econ_sanctions.html; Internet. Louis Salome, ''Ex-
U.S. Military Officers Assist Croat Army," Cox News Service, comments on the MPRI professionals assiting 
the Croatian Army. Salome states, "Since last fall [1994 J. MPRI has had a contract directly with the State 
. Department to provide monitors who assist the Geneva-based [lCFY). The monitors work along the Bosnia-
Serbia border" to "watch for military trucks or equipment crossing into Bosnia from Serbia." 
118United Nations, Copenhagen Round Table on UN Sanctions, 7. 
119]ohn Strembleau, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Sharpening International 
Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations [on line), (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 
November 1996), accessed 20 April 1998; available from http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/summary/su96_ex.html; 
Internet. 
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Enforcement and implementation was also undertaken along the Danube River 
by the WEU, and enforcement in the Adriatic Sea was conducted by WEU and NATO 
warships. These efforts were also coordinated with SAMCOMM in Brussels. 
In summary, the EU and OSCE were responsible for monitoring land routes 
going into the FRY (SIM) from its respective neighbor states, the WEU controlled 
enforcement on the Danube River, WED and NATO warships patrolled FRY (SIM),s sea 
lines of communication in the Adriatic, and the ICFY Mission enforced sanctions along the 
FRY (SIM) - Bosnia-Herzegovina border (those areas under control of the Bosnian Serb 
forces). Although some leakages occurred, primarily prior to UNSCR 820, "significant 
cooperation" existed in the sanctions regime on the FRY (SIM). 
d) Presence of International Assistance 
Presence of international assistance to the target country is the mirror image 
of, or invertly related to, international cooperation with the sender country. Assistance to ~e 
target country usually comes from its neighbors and allies, either overtly or covertly. HSE 
state, "Target countries are seldom cut off from alternative markets or financing sources 
when sanctions are imposed; trade and financial channels usually remain open, even though 
at a higher cost. For this reason, we [HSE] do not count evasive and covert trade as 
'assistance. "'120 As such, HSE's study is only concerned with evidence of overt economic or 
military aid to the target country in response to the imposition of sanctions. 
120RSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 45. 
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In the FRY (SIM) case, there is no evidence to suggest that any of FRY 
(SIM),s neighbors, allies, or fonner allies provided overt assistance during the sanctions 
episode. As mentioned in the preceding section on international cooperation, SAMs were 
allowed to operate in the FRY (SIM),s neighboring states of Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary, Ukraine, Albania, and the FRYOM, thereby eliminating overt support from 
neighboring countries. Additionally, Russia overtly complied with the sanctions regime as 
well. The former Yugoslavia was a traditional ally of the fonner Soviet Union based on 
communist ideology and historic Slavic-Serbian ties. During the crisis in the fonner 
Yugoslavia, however, these historical links may have been overstated. For example, 
Milosevic "criticized the Russians, saying that they presumed to a far greater influence in 
Serbia, based on historic Slav-Serb ties, than was justified. He [Milosevic] was scornful of 
Moscow's attempts to pressure or bribe the Serbs with aid - 'tons of rotten meat, and crap 
like that,' he [Milosevic] said."121 To summarize, with its neighbors and traditional allies 
participating in the sanctions episode, international assistance to the FRY (SIM) was not 
present. 
There was ample evidence of a black market trade with the FRY (SIM), 
however. Government Accounting Office report states that although the "Serbian economy is 
suffering a significant disruption," evidence indicates "significant violations of the 
121Holbrooke, To End a War, 114. 
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sanctions."122 From 15 October 1992 to 28 January 1993, SAM teams reported 772 
suspected violations.123 Whatever the number, the violators were primarily taking advantage 
of the loopholes found in the sanction regime at that time; specifically, the allowance of 
transshipments through the FRY (SIM) to the recipient country. In practice, however, these 
shipments offloaded their cargo in the FRY (SIM) and returned to their point of origin or 
continued on to their destination with their cargoholds empty. Forged customs documents 
were often used to evade customs officials and the SAM teams. 
Despite the covert aid to the FRY (SIM), the emergent black market still could 
not provide the means necessary to effectively run its economy. As such, HSE discounts the 
role of covert aid and the blackmarket. Nonetheless, UNSeR 820 (April 1993) closed those 
loopholes found in the existing sanction regime, including the elimination of the 
transshipment allowance. Because target countries often find ways to circumvent a sanctions 
regime, the Carnegie Commission criticizes sanction regimes that are implemented slowly 
and incrementally. Rather, the sanction regime should be complete, comprehensive, and all-
encompassing.124 
122Government Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Serbia-
Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Sanctions (GAOINSIAD-93-174), by Frank C. Conahan, Report to the 
Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C., April 1993), 4-8. 
123Ibid., 22. These numbers are suspected as being low due to the lack of consistant inspection criteria, 
reporting, and operating procedures among the SAM teams. Further, U.S. intelligence agencies did not provide 
their evidence on violations to this report. 
124Strembleau, Sharpening Sanctions, 24. 
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e) Target Country's Political and Economic Health 
The economic and political health of the target country are critical to the 
outcome of a sanctions episode. A weakened or distressed target is more susceptable to 
economic sanctions than a stable target. HSE state, "Similarily, sanctions may be redundant, 
productive, or useless in pursuing foreign policy goals, depending on the economic health 
and political stability of the target country."125 HSE identify three categories describing the 
target's political and economic health: "distress, significant problems, and strong and 
stable."126 HSE's description of each are as follows: 
(1) Distress: a country with acute economic problems, exemplified by high 
unemployment and rampant inflation, coupled with political turmoil 
bordering on chaos. 
(2) Significant problems: a country with severe economic problems, such as a 
foreign-exchange crisis, coupled with substantial internal dissent. 
(3) Stong and stable: a country with the government in firm control (even 
though dissent may be present) and an economy experiencing only the 
normal range of inflation, unemployment and similar illS.127 
The former Yugoslavia degraded from a country with significant problems to 
one of distress, once the forces of secession were in motion. However, as the FRY (SIM) is 
the target country in this sanctions episode, this analysis will concentrate on the conditions in 
that country. Unfortunately, comprehensive economic data is not available for years 1992 
and 1993 on the countries formed after the former Yugoslavia's dissolution in 1991. 




Therefore, the analysis of the economic and political health of the FRY (SIM) will utilize 
data for the former Yugoslavia on the eve of the breakup and extract information on Serbia 
and Montenegro. 
As mentioned in Chapter IT, the former Yugoslavia's economic system was 
prone to unemployment, high inflation, and decreasing productivity. As one scholar noted, 
on the eve of the breakup, "Yugoslavia was in an unprecedented economic and socio-political 
crisis. Nationwide, in 1989, the unemployment rate measured approximately 20 percent, 
some 60 percent of the population were living at or below the poverty line, and inflation had 
climbed to a yearly 2,500 percent."128 The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia exacerbated 
these problems. 
One of Tito's methods to create a unified country was to place the various 
modes of industrial production in the various republics, thereby creatiD;g inter-republic 
economic ties and trade. For example, the M-84A tank (based on the former Soviet T-72) 
was made in every republic of the former federation: 36 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 
percent in Serbia, 26 percent in Croatia, 7 percent in Slovenia, and 1 percent in 
Montenegro.129 With the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars of 
secession, these critical inter-republic economic linkages collapsed, resulting in a drop in 
production and unemployment. In an address in Vienna in April 1993, Slovenian economist 
128P1estina, "Democracy and Nationalism in Croatia," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 
125. 
129Miodrag Ivanovic, ''The Fate of the Yugoslav Military Industry," Jane's Intelligence Review 5, no. 3 
(March 1993): 164. 
75 
Jose Mencinger warned "that the combination of the breakup of the unified Yugoslav market 
and of the war itself had so thoroughly undermined the economic structure of the former 
Yugoslav republics that they now stood on the brinkof economic disaster."130 Specifically, 
according to Mencinger's 1992 figures for Serbia, economic production was 55 percent of the 
1989 figure; the value of exports declined 50 percent; and inflation was at 19,810 percent. 131 
Unemployment had reached 3 million people by November 1992 (out of a total population of 
10.5 million) and the number was rising.132 
There were significant problems in the internal political areana as well. The 
Yugoslav Federation had been showing signs of strain since Tito's death in 1980. The rise of 
nationalism in the Croat, Slovene, and Serb republics eroded the Titoist view of a federated 
state. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was elected President of that republic in March 1989. 
Milosevic launched a campaign for a stengthened federal center, located in Belgrade and 
dominated by the Serbs. Unsurprisingly, this campaign was strongly opposed by the 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Fear of Serbian nationalism and domination by a Serbian-
controlled, federated state precipitated calls for independence in Slovenia and Croatia. In 
December 1990, Slovenia held a referendum for an "independent and sovereign Slovenia," 
where 89 percent voted "yes."133 
130Ramet, ''The Yugoslav Crisis and the West," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 456. 
131Ibid. 
132Ibid.,7. 
133Dennsion Rusinow, "The A voidable Catastrophe," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 27. 
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In response, on 15 March 1991, Serbia's member of the presidency, Borislav 
Iovic, called for the INA to quell any internal dissent. The eight-member collective 
Presidency of Yugoslavia voted down this request. Milosevic created a constitutional crisis 
when he declared that Serbia would not recognize any decisions from the collective federal 
Presidency and the INA would be used to maintain the federation. Milosevic's goal was to 
maintain the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by creating a stong central government under 
Serbian control. As the calls for secession in the republics intensified, Milosevic abandoned 
this goal and took up the new charge of a "Greater Serbia," and by Iune 1991, war broke out 
in the Slovene and Croat republics. 
Concurrently, Milosevic's opposition organized violent, anti-communist 
demonstrations in Belgrade in March 1991.134 During these disturbances, the Serbian police 
killed two protestors and the INA was deployed to the streets of Belgrade. The INA planned. 
to impose a general state of emergency throughout the country, but this was rejected by the 
collective Presidency. In response, the INA high command began planning for a coup to oust 
the collective Presidency and its supporters, which, by extention, would include Milosevic.135 
Fearing foreign repercussions, however, the INA abandoned this idea .. 
Milosevic's main political support comes from an older generation of Serbs 
living in the rural areas of Serbia. His opponents are primarily the younger generation of 
Serbs living in urban areas, as typified in the anti-Milosevic demonstrations of March 1991, 
134Marko Milivojevic, ''The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia: Sliding into War," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. 
Ramet and Adamovich, 74. 
135lbid., 75. 
77 
March 1992, and June 1992.136 In addition, these protests had a more visable representation 
from women. Despite Milosevic's call to Serbian nationalism, there was significant 
opposition to his communist links, as well as resistance to his support for the war. 
In summary, the evidence indicates that FRY (SIM),s economy experienced 
"significant problems," which bordered on "distress," in the prelude to the sanctions regime. 
Further, its internal political system, while not degenerating into chaos, experienced 
substantial internal dissent. 
f) Prior Relations between the Target and Sender Countries 
Sanctions are imposed on friends and adversaries alike. Depending on the 
nature of the prior relationship, sanctions may be forceful in nature against adversaries or 
mild and suggestive against friends. HSE classified the state of relations between the sender 
and target countries prior to the implementation of sanctions in three categories: antagonistic 
(Arab-Israeli relations), neutral (illustrated by relations between Spain and the United 
Kingdom despite centuries of dispute over Gibraltar), and cordial (U.S. relations with the 
United Kingdom and France before the Suez crisis of 1956).137 HSE's findings indicate that 
sanctions are most effective when aimed against erstwhile friends and close trading partners. 
During the Cold War years, the former Yugoslavia had a triangular 
relationship with the United States and the former Soviet Union. This relationship with the 
136Ramet, ''The Serbian Church a~d the Serbian Nation," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and Adamovich, 
106. 
137HSE, Economic Sanctions ReconSidered, 47. 
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superpowers were inversly related; when Yugoslav-Soviet relations were good, then 
Yugoslav-U.S. relations were bad, and vice versa. Three periods defined the former 
Yugoslavia's relationship with the superpowers: 1943 - 1948, 1948 - 1955, and 1955-
1990.138 
In the first phase, Yugoslav-Soviet relations were good as Stalin tried to align 
the former Yugoslavia within the Warsaw Pact framework. Initially, the United States also 
had good relations with former Yugoslavia. Building on common anti-fascist efforts in 
World War II, the United States supported a Tito-ruled Yugoslavia for the post-World War II 
era. By 1946, however, U.S. support for Tito had faded. The United States resented the 
former Yugoslavia's territorial claims and interference in the area, specifically in Italy and 
Greece. Additionally, in 1946, the Yugoslavs shot down two U.S. Air Force planes when 
they strayed into Yugoslav airspace.139 
The second phase began in 1955 when the Soviet Union expelled Yugoslavia 
from the COMINFORM and implemented a blockade. This action forced Yugoslavia to tum 
to the West. The United States and Western European countries responded with a $15 billion 
(1992 U.S. Dollars) aid package.140 Additionally, the United States provided military 
equipment and training to the JNA. Further, the Balkan Pact signed between Yugoslavia, 
Greece, and Turkey was a collective defense treaty, which effectively brought Yugoslavia 





into NATO as a quasi-member (since Greece and Turkey were NATO members). This strong 
alignment to the west changed after Stalin's death and Soviet Premier Khrushchev's 
subsequent visit to Belgrade in 1955. 
The Soviet Union's rapprochement with Tito did not drive Yugoslavia back 
into the Soviet-Warsaw pact alliance, however. Rather, Yugoslavia's policy was to remain 
equidistant from the super powers, which resulted in Yugoslavia becoming a leader in the 
non-aligned movement. Non-alignment remained the cornerstone for Yugoslavia's foreign 
policy until 1990. Despite the Soviet rapprochement during this period (1955-1990), U.S.-
Yugoslav relations were more sound than was the case with Soviet-Yugoslav relations.141 
Throughout the 1980s, Yugoslavia's international prestige and position waned 
as East-West tensions decreased. As the Cold War drew down, Yugoslavia's position was no 
longer important to the United States, and thus, U.S. involvement in the region diminished. 
As a result, western European states increased their influence and envolvement in 
Yugoslavia. 142 
The political relationship between the former Yugoslavia and western 
Eurpoean states was shaped by commercial and financial incentives. Western Europe 
supported Yugoslav efforts to gain membership in the Council of Europe, the European Free 
Trade Agreement, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and 
141 Ibid., 340. 
142Tbe Soviet Union's, and later Russia's, involvement also diminished. By the late 1980's, the USSR 
endorsed various western European initiatives in the region. In fact, Russia, following the lead of western 
European states, recognized Croatia and Slovenia prior to U.S. recognition. ''This was a great blow for Serbia, 
where it was received as a 'betrayal' of a centuries-long friendship." Ibid., 343-344. 
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eventually, the European Union. Yugoslavia realized that a delay would result in much-
needed capital flows being diverted to other East European states. Yugoslavia's acceptance, 
however, was tied to democratic reforms, multi-party elections, an independent judiciary, and 
human rights. 143 The European states' reform policies toward the former Yugoslavia ran into 
the same problem that faced the United States, that being the antithetical goals of unity and 
democracy. As the nationalists swept into power in Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia, "unity was 
sacrificed on the altar of Slovenian or Croatian democratic self-determination," thus resulting 
in war at the expense of democractic reforms and human rights. 
In summary, because of the fluctuations in its relationships with other 
countries, the former Yugoslavia's overall relationship with the sender countries is classified 
as neutral. As the FRY (SIM) attempted to achieve its goal of a 'Greater Serbia' through the 
use of force and utilizing the tactic of ethnic cleansing, this neutral relationship rapidly turned 
into one of antagonism. 
2. Economic Variables 
a) Cost Imposed on the Target Country 
Cases that inflict heavy costs are usually successfuL As shown in table 4-1, 
the average cost to the target for all successful cases was 2.4 percent of the target country's 
Gross National Product (GNP); for failure cases, GNP loss was only 1.0 percent. For cases 
where the sender's policy goal was to seek a major change in the target's behavior, the cost to 
143Zachary T. Irwin, "Yugoslavia's Relations with European States," in Beyond Yugoslavia, ed. Ramet and 
Adamovich,364. 
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the target for all success cases was 4.5 percent of GNP; for failure cases, GNP loss was a 
mere 0.5 percent.144 Overall, in order for sanctions to be successful, they must impose a 
decrease 2.4 percent in the target country's GNP. In the case of the FRY (SIM), however, 
where a major policy change was sought by the sender countries, the cost to the FRY (SIM) 
economy should be 4.5 percent or higher. 
Table 4-1. Cost of sanctions to the target country, by percentage of GNP 
Policy Goal Success Cases Failure Cases 
Modest Policy Goals 1.2 0.4 
Destabilization 4.1 2.2 
Disruption of military adventures 0.4 2.0 
Military impairment 4.3 1.2 
Other major policy changes 4.5 0.5 
All cases 2.4 1.0 
Source: HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102. 
This section will provide evidence of how the -sanctions episode impaired the 
FRY (SIM) economy. Specifically, the evidence will show that the sanctions episode 
degraded FRY (SIM),s Gross Domestic Product (GOP) as well as its foreign trade. Further, 
~anctions caused a high rate of unemployment. At this point, it is iinportant to note the 
difference between GNP and GOP. Both are utilized to measure a country's national income 
accounts, or wealth. HSE use GNP in their studies, however, as mentioned earlier, limited 
data exists on the specific republics of the fromer Yugoslavia. Further, GNP information on 
the FRY (SIM) during 1991 through 1993 is scarce due to the breakup and subsequent wars. 
144HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 101. 
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However, GDP data is available on the former Yugoslav republic of Serbia and the FRY 
(SIM). Before presenting that data, a brief summary on the differences between GNP and 
GDP is necessary. 
GNP is closely related to GDP. Where they differ is, in effect, where national 
boundaries are drawn. A country's GNP includes all outputs produced by that country's 
owned inputs, no matter where they are.located in the world. For example, a Ford Motor 
Company plant in Canada contributes to U.S. GNP, however, that same Ford plant would not 
contribute to Canada's GNP. GDP, on the other hand, counts all output produced in a 
country, regardless of who owns the input. In other words, output from foreign owned inputs 
count towards GDP. Using the above example, Canada's GDP would include the Ford Motor 
Company's factory output, but Canada's GNP would not. Similarily, Japanese-owned auto 
plants located in the United States contribute to U.S. GDP, but not to its GNP.145 
In the case of FRY (SIM), GDP and GNP are similar. The factories and 
industries of the former Yugoslavia, as well as the FRY (SIM), are state-owned. Foreign 
owned inputs were virtually non-existant in the former Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav 
factories and industries were domestically located. Therefore, the GDP figures used in the 
following paragraph suffice for HSE's use of GNP. 
In 1990, the former Yugoslav republic of Serbia had a GDP of $24 billion. 
The per capita income was over $3,000. By 1993, however, FRY (SIM),s GDP had dropped 
145 Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Macro Economics: An Integrated Approach (Cincinatti: 
South-Western College Publishing, 1995. 
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to under $10 billion and per capita income was $700.146 This represents a decline in GDP, or 
cost to the target country, of 58.3 percent from 1990 to 1993. 
A look at the FRY (SIM) , s trade statistics provides some insight into the 
dramatic drop in the country's GDP. The following figures come from the International 
Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. Figure 4-2 provides the [mal year 
of trade statistics for the former Yugoslavia. 
Table 4-2. Trade Statistics for the former Yugoslavia, 
for 1991. in millions of U.S. Dollars 
Exports bnports 
Yugoslavia 13,953 14,737 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, 1996. 
There are no trade statistics available for 1992 for the five countries that emerged from the 
former Yugoslavia. The first year trade information is available on these countries is 1993. 
Figure 4-3 shows the trade figures for FRY (SIM), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia for the years 1993 through 1995. While trade actually increased for the FRY 
(SIM) from 1993 to 1995, the increases can be attributed to the UNSC's partial easing of 
trade restrictions on FRY (SIM) in response to that countries compliance with various peace 
initiatives, allowable delivery of humanitarian aid, and FRY (SIM), s use of loopholes found 
in the sanctions regime (prior to UNSCR 820). The imports that were allowed to be 
146Richard Becker, "The Role of Sanctions in the Destruction of Yugoslavia," in NATO in the Balkans, ed. 
Ramsey Clark (New York: International Action Center, 1998), 72. 
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delivered, primarily humanitarian goods, totally depleted domestic cash reserves. 147 Despite 
the small increases in exports and imports, overall, sanctions devastated FRY (SIM). Prior to 
the breakup, most of the industrial and manufacturing centers were located in the Serbian 
areas of the former Yugoslavia. When comparing the FRY (SIM) trade levels to the trade 
levels of primarily agrarian Macedonia or war-tom Bosnia, one can see the effects of the 
sanctions. 
































Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o/Trade Statistics, 1996. 
Milan Panic, Chairman of leN Pharmaceuticals (FRY ~SIM) company) and 
former Prime Minister of the FRY (SIM) (1992), made the following comment about the 
lifting of sanctions: 
The lifting of sanctions is a momentous event, for seldom in our history have we seen 
such severe economic hardship in place .... What will the lifting of sanctions mean to 
the economy of Yugoslavia [FRY (SIM)]? First, it will begin to restore economic 
normalcy, replacing inflation, unemployment, and economic and political instability 
with stable prices and a stronger currency. It will attract foreign investment, 
providing cash-starved Yugoslav [FRY (SIM)] companies with the funds needed to 
get moving again.148 
147Nikola Cicanovic, "International Sanctions - Rationale and Impact [on line]," Serbia Bulletin (November 
1996, accessed 21 April 1998); available from http://www.yugoslavia.com/Bulletin/96/96111961102.htm; 
Internet. 
148Milan Panic, Statement on Impact of Lifting UN Economic Sanctions Made in Costa Mesa, CA on OS 
December 1997 [on line], accessed 21 April 1998, available from 
http://www.twoten.press.netlstories/9S/12/0SlheadlinesIECONOMY _ Yugoslavia.Panic.html; Internet. 
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Panic's statement sheds some light on the economic problems caused by the sanctions. 
Extensive evidence exists that clarifies Panic's comments. 
According to FRY (SIM) Vice-Premier Dragan Tomic, the cumulative losses 
caused by the sanctions amounted to between $100 billion and $150 billion.149 Along with 
destroying FRY (S/M)'s industrial export markets, the sanctions caused a severe shortages of 
imported spare parts and raw materials. In 1993 alone, FRY (SIM) , s industrial output fell by 
40 percent and retail sales droped 70 percent from 1992 figures. Because of the drop in sales, 
approximately 60 percent of the industrial labor force was laid off.150 Inflation that became 
hyperinflation undermined the integrity of FRY (SIM)'s currency and eliminated the value of 
savings. Inflation was 122 percent in 1991; 9,000 percent in 1992; and was more than 100 
trillion percent in 1993.151 
There is ample evidence on the dismal state of economic affairs in the FRY 
(SIM). What is unknown and difficult to determine is what portion of this decline may be 
attributable to sanctions and what portion to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. As 
mentioned earlier, the industrial base and economy relied on inter-republic trade. The 
dissolution of the country five new states, coupled with the wars of secession, certainly had a 
149"Analysis: Moves to Lift Sanctions are Reward for Serbian Leader [on line]," Reuters Information 
Service, 21 November 1995 (accessed 19 April 1998); available from 
http://www2.nando.netinewsroom/ntnlworldI112195/world 190t.side3.hunl; Internet. 
15°American University, Serbia Sanctions and the Environment [on line] (Washington D.C.: American 
University, July 1995, accessed 28 April 1998; available from 
http://gurukuLucc.american.edulrED/SERBSANC.htm; Internet. 
151 Department of State, Inter-Agency Task Force on Serbian Sanctions, UN Sanctions Against Belgrade: 
Lessons Learnedfor Future Regimes (Washington, D.C., June 1996), 3. 
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negative effect on the country. Sanctions, at the very least, made a bad situation worse by 
preventing the restructuring of the FRY (SIM)'s newly formed economy. 
b) Commercial Relations between the Target and Sender Countries 
Economic sanctions are most effective when aimed against close trading 
partners. In the cases seeking major policy changes, HSE have identified that if the average 
trade linkage between the target and sender is at least 36 percent, then the sanctions episode 
will be successful.152 To identify the FRY (SIM)'s major trading partners, the IMP's 
Direction of Trade Statistics will be used again. Once again, problems arise in finding exact 
data due to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. FRY (SIM) , s trade statistics and data 
on their major trading partners do not exist for 1992. Data is available starting in 1993, 
however, the trade entering and leaving the FRY (SIM) was authorized by the sanction 
sending countries. This data is, therefore, skewed.153 Trade information from 1991, the last 
year of relative normalcy for the former Yugoslavia, will be used to identify the major trading 
partners. To summarize, the former Yugoslavia's total trade for 1991 consisted of $13.953 
billion in exports and $14.737 billion of imports. Table 4-4 shows the major trading partners 
for the former Yugoslavia for.1991. Data is presented in percentage of total trade. 
152HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 99. 
153Por exports, 91.9 percent went to developing countries, which include all NATO countries, Austria, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, New Zeland, and Australia. Por imports, 91.9 percent came from the industrial 
countries. 
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N=$13.953 billion N=$14.737 billion 
68.5 67.4 
61.7 56.7 
Developing Countries 31.5 32.6 
European 21.6 22.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996. 
A majority of the former Yugoslavia's trade took place with NATO countries. This specific 
category is highlighted as NATO had, and continues to have, a vested interest in the region; 
with the assumption being that because of that vested interest, NATO countries would adhere 
to, as well as enforce, the UNSCR sanctions. Other categories could have been highlighted 
as well, such as the European Union and the United States, with similar results. Again, these 
figures far exceed HSE's finding that in successful sanctions episodes the trade linkage 
between the target and sender is at least 36 percent. 
c) Relative Economic Size of the Countries 
The economy of the sender country is usually much larger than that of the 
target country. HSE state, "In most cases, the sender's GNP is over 10 times greater than the 
target's GNP, and in over half the ratio is greater than 50."154 One exception to this is when 
the target country controls a strategic commodity, such as oil. An example of this exception 
is the 1973 Arab Oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands. Because the 
sender's economies are almost always much larger than the target's, relative size is not as 
important in predicting the success of a sanctions episode. As described by HSE, "The 
154HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 63. 
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relative size of the target economy is less important than other factors that come into play, 
such as the extent of trade linkage, the economic impact of the sanctions, and the warmth of 
relations between sender and target prior to the imposition of sanctions."155 
Due to the large number of sender countries in this case, a comparative 
economic analysis of the former Yugoslavia's two largest trading partners, Italy and 
Germany, will be used to provide an indication of the relative economic size between the 
target and sender countries.156 Table 4-5 shows 1991 GDP figures for Italy, Germany, and 
the FRY (81M). Germany's economy is 57.7 times larger that the FRY (81M) economy, the 
French economy is 41.2 times larger, and cumulatively, these two sender countries' 
economies are 98.7% larger that the FRY (81M) economy.157 




FRY (81M) 23.7 
Source: UN, 1998 UN Statistical Yearbook 
d) Type of Sanctions Used 
The sanctions regime on the FRY (81M) utilized trade ~d financial sanctions. 
Restrictions on imports to and exports from the FRY (81M) were instituted by UN8CRs 757 
155Ibid., 99. 
156International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996. In 1991, the Former Yugoslavia 
exported $4.636 billion (33.2% oftotal exports) worth of goods to Germany and $2.545 billion (18.2%) to Italy; 
imports from Germany totalled $4.371 billion (29.7% of total imports) worth of goods and $2.296 billion 
(15.8%) from Italy. 
157Sender country's GDP divided by target country's GDP equals target country's economic relative size. 
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and 820. Additionally, financial sanctions were also a part of these resolutions. This so 
called "outer wall" of sanctions preclued the FRY (SIM) from receiving financing from 
international financial institutions and governments. With financial sanctions in place, the 
FRY (SIM) is unable to receive financing from institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (ERBD). Assets of the former Yugoslavia were also frozen worldwide.158 
While the trade sanctions have been lifted on the FRY (SIM) as a reward for its signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accord, the "outer wall" was kept in place. 
The United States and the international community do not recognize FRY 
(SIM) as the successor state to the former Yugoslavia. Further, the FRY (SIM) is still not 
permitted to participate in the UN or the OCSE and its membership in the World Bank, IMP, 
and EBRD has been blocked. The international community has kept the "outer wall" in place 
in order to maintain leverage on the FRY (SIM) to ensure their compliance and support of the 
Dayton Peace Accords. Further, this leverage has been used recently over human rights 
abuses in Kosovo.159 
158Departtnent of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets ContrOl, "What You Need to Know About the 
Embargo [on line]," A Summary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Regualations - Title 31 Pan 
385 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation (Washington, D.C., 20 May 1997, accessed 09 April 1998); 
available at http://www.itaiep.doc.gov/eebiclbalkan/sanctions/yugo.htm; Internet. The freezing of assets 
includes all property and property interests, including inventory, contracts, accounts payable and receivable, 
deposit accounts, and funds transfers. 
159Departtnent of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Serbia-Montenegro Country 
Repon on Human Rights Practices for 1996 [on line] (Washington, D.C., 30 January 1997, accessed 09 April 
1998); available at http://www.state.gov/www/global!human_rights/1996_hrp_reporcserbiamo.htm1; Internet. 
90 
The presence of financial sanctions in a sanctions episode strengthens trade 
sanctions. HSE state, "The economic costs of sanctions as a percentage of target-country 
GNP were nearly twice as high when finance was interrupted as when trade alone was 
interrupted."160 In HSE's case studies, the presence of financial sanctions increased the 
chance of success. This fact, coupled with the humanitarian consequences of trade sanctions, 
have led economists and foreign policy experts to address whether or not financial sanctions 
alone would be enough to achieve foreign policy goals. Their argument is that financial 
sanctions could be directly targeted on the target country's power-elite, by passing innocent 
civilians.161 This thesis, however, utilizes HSE's definition of economic sanctions, which 
includes both trade and financial sanctions. Whether or not fmancial sanctions alone were 
the deteImining factor in the FRY (SIM) case, or in others, is a topic for futher research. 
e) Cost to the Sender Country 
The more the sanctions episode costs the sender country, the less likely it is that 
sanctions will succeed. HSE look at the sender country's loss of exports to the target country 
during the sanctions episode and then identify four classifications in their cost-to-sender 
index: 1) net gain to the sender (usually cases where aid has been withheld); 2) little effect on 
the sender (insignificant losses occur); 3) modest loss to the sender (some trade is lost, but 
not a substantial amount); and 4) major loss to the sender (large volumes of trade are 
160HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 71. 
1610eorge A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Financial Sanctions: The Key to a 'Smart' Sanctions Strategy" 
[on line] (The Fourth Freedom Forum: Fall 1997, accessed 11 September 1998); available from 
http://www.fourthfreedom.org/sanctions/financialSanctionsSmartSanctions.hUn!; Internet. 
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adverselyaffected).162 In the cases where major policy changes in the target country were 
sought, HSE identify an index score of 2.0 for successful cases and 2.3 for failure cases.163 
Their results suggest that "sender governments should design sanctions so as not to inflict 
unduly concentrated costs on particular domestic groupS."164 
Table 4-6 presents selected sender counties' loss in exports due to sanctions 
on the FRY (SIM). The selected countries were chosen as they bordered the fonner 
Yugoslavia or were identified as their main trading partners; the United States was chosen to 
provide a comparison. 
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. Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996. 
a Russian figures are for 1992. 1991 data does not exist. 




Germany experienced the greatest absolute cost due to the sanctions, losing $4.186 billion in 
exports, however the relative loss was only 1.0 percent of their total exports. Bulgaria 
experienced the largest relative cost of 9.2 percent of its total exports, or $195 million, due to 
the sanctions. 
Overall, the sanctions episode on the FRY (S/M) had little effect on the sender 
countries. Bulgaria's loss may be classified as a "modest loss." Again, losses due to 
sanctions are difficult to determine considering the economic disruption that was caused by 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. As mentioned earlier, the former Yugoslav industrial 
modes of production were distributed among the republics. When the country broke apart, so 
did its industrial base, thereby disrupting the economy. Wheter or not Bulgaria's modest loss 
was attributable to sanctions or the breakup of the former Yugoslavia is difficult to 
distinguish. 
C. SANCTIONS AS A LEVERAGE - DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS 
The diplomatic records of David Owen and Richard Holbrook offer a unique 
perspective on the use of sanctions as leverage on Milosevic's FRY (S/M). While some of 
.their writings were presented in the previous section, this section looks at how these 
diplomats utilized sanctions in their peacemaking efforts. David Owen, in his book, Balkan 
Odyssey, describes his efforts as the EU representative to the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace 
talks. Owen, along with former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, authored the Vance-
Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), which was presented to, and subsequently rejected by, the warring 
factions in 1993. Richard Holbrooke, in this book, To End a War, describes the U.S. 
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diplomatic efforts in the peace making endeavor. Holbrooke negotiated the Dayton Peace 
Accord which effectively ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995. Both 
offer insights as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions in coercing Milosevic to end the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
1. Vance Owen Peace Plan 
The origins of the V OPP began on 03 January 1993 at a plenary session of the 
Bosnian parties, convened by the ICFY. The three main points of contention that came from 
this session were: 1) constitutional principles in the Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution, 2) the 
cessation of hostilities, and 3) allocating territory to the three warring factions. 165 While the 
Bosnian Croats were noncommital to these three points, the Bosnian Muslims agreed on 
points one and two while rejecting the third, and the Bosnian Serbs rejected all three. Almost 
immediately, Owen and Vance recognized the need to split the Serbs. According to Owen, 
"Splitting the Serbs was something we had to achieve, not for its own sake but because 
otherwise the Bosnian Serbs would remain totally intransigent, and that became the pattern 
for the future. Without pressure from [FRY SIM], the Bosnian Serbs would not give an inch, 
for they were not pragmatists, like Milosevic, but ideologues, Serb nationalists who did not 
want a single Muslim to live on the territory they claimed for themselves, and preferable no 
Croats either."166 At the third meeting of the plenary session, Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan 
1650wen, Balkan Odyssey, 102. 
166Ibid., 102. Owen goes on to state that many Muslims live in Serbia, for example, the Sandzak region and 
in the urban areas, such as Belgrade. 
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Karadzic made key concessions, primarily over land; Vance and Owen believed that Karadzic 
had been instructed by Milosevic to make those concessions. 
In order to pressure the Bosnian Serb ideologues, Milosevic was summoned to visit 
Paris to meed with French President Mitterand, Vance, and Owen. Owen describes the 
meeting as such: 
Vance and I felt after the afternoon session that if Milosevic was going to risk his 
neck over Bosnia-Herzegovina, he would want something significant for it. That 
view was reinforced by Milosevic's parting comment of the afternoon to me after 
Mitterand's powerful peroration: 'Why did he not raise the lifting of sanctions?' Ever 
the pragmatist, the emotion had not seemingly moved him at all. What he wanted 
was a bargain and to be treated equally. Sanctions were to him a slight on the Serbian 
nation as well as an economic millstone. He was ready to deal over economic 
sanctions then, and he showed even greater readiness a month later in Belgrade.167 
Negotiations over the VOPP dragged on through March 1993. By 25 March 1993, the VOPP 
had signatories from all sides in the conflict, with the exception of the Bosnian Serbs. Owen 
comments on obtaining that hold-out signature: "I knew that only Milosevic could deliver the 
Bosnian Serbs and that he was vulnerable in one area: financial sanctions. The Security 
council had to squeeze assets .... We had to tighten every area of sanctions, for there was 
much economic intelligence showing that Milosevic was becoming really worried about the 
Serbian economy."168 As a result of the Bosnian Serb failure to sign the VOPP, UNSeR 820 
was passed on 17 April 1993. One week later, Milosevic formally gave up the idea of a 





Upon the failure of the VOPP, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued for two and 
a half years. Other peace plans followed the VOPP - the Invincible package (coined from the 
meeting on the HMS Invincible), the EU Action Plan, the Contact Group plan, and finally, 
the Dayton Accord. Throughout these various negotiations, sanctions continued to take their 
toll in the FRY (SIM) economy and were used as leverage in their respective negotiations. 
By July 1994, evidence suggests that sanctions had once again split Belgrade from Pale (the 
Bosnian Serb's self-proclaimed capital). The 31 July 1994 edition of Politika, the main pro-
government daily in Belgrade, carried on its front page a statement from Milosevic 
supporting the Contact Group Plan: 
The Bosnian Serb Republic could never have been formed without the help of FRY 
[FRY (SIM)]. The very least that the Yugoslavs can expect from the Bosnian Serbs is 
that they save them from further sanctions. There are no moral grounds whatsoever to 
justify additional sacrifices from the FRY and the entire Serbian people.169 
Nonetheless, the Contact Group plan collapsed as the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia spiralled out of control. 
In May 1995, the Croatian Army, utilizing their newly acquired tanks, artillery, and 
fighter aircraft, routed the Croatian Serbs out of the Krajina. Within the next few months, the 
BSA would take Zepa and Srebrinica, NATO would mount its largest airstrike in history, and 
the Bosnian Federation would retake territory from the BSA. These actions, in large part, 
solved the partition of territory problem within Bosnia-Herzegovina. 




[The Security Council should] have recognized economic sanctions as being a far 
more crucial lever for peace than was the case in the former Yugoslavia. There 
[should] have been a better appreciation within the Council of sanctions as both a 
stick and a carrot. They are usually applied too late and too weakly and maintained 
for too long. Economic sanctions were applied far too slowly on the FRY (S/M) and 
were soon ineffective ... Financial sanctions should have been applied on the FRY 
(S/M) as part of the first sanctions package in May 1992. They finally did come into 
action at the end of April 1993; trying to avoid them was the key factor influencing 
Milosevic to endorse VOPP. Conversely, a greater readiness in the Security Council 
to offer Milosevic an inducement by suspending some sanctions might have been 
more forthcoming if all members had been accepting responsibility on the ground 
[referring to the lack of troop commitments to enforce the VOPP, specifically 
referring to the United States].170 
2. Dayton Peace Accord 
The negotiation leading up to the Dayton Accords had gone adrift. While Milosevic 
"hated sanctions" and wanted them lifted, by the fall of 1994 Britain, France, and Russia 
were debating whether or not to ease, or outright eliminate, the sanctions regime.171 On the 
other hand, U.S. Vice President Gore, Leon Fuerth, and Madeleine Albright were staunch 
supporters of the hard-line approach on sanctions against the FRY (S/M).172 
As Operation DELffiERATE FORCE (NATO's largest airstrike on the BSA) 
commenced on 30 August 1995, Holbrooke and his negotiating team were in Belgrade 
meeting with Milosevic. This meeting was critical for two reasons. First, Milosevic 
produced what has now been called the 'Patriarch Paper.' This document, witnessed and 
170lbid., 398. 
171Holbrooke, To End a War, 88. 
172Leon Fuerth is the U. S. "sanctions czar." Fuerth is Vice President Gore's National Security Advisor and 
oversees sanctions against other countries, including Iran and Iraq. Responsibility for sanctions policy was taken 
away from the U.S. State Department in 1993 and given to Fuerth, apparanUy because of State's failure to 
manage them properly. Ibid. 
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signed by Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serb Orthodox Church, creates a joint FRY 
(S/M)-Bosnian Serb delegation to future negotiations.l73 With this agreement, the "splitting 
of the Serbs" had finally taken place. Second, as NATO bombs were being dropped on BSA 
positions, Holbrooke noted that Milosevic's main concern was sanctions relief, not bombing 
relief, that he sought in exchange for the Patriarch Paper.174 Milosevic backed his intentions 
up by agreeing to a critical concession, signed on 04 September 1995, that Bosnia-
Herzegovina would "continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing 
international recognition."175 
Almost concurrent with the NATO air strikes, the Bosnian Federation went on the 
offensive, adding further military and political pressure on the Serbs. While Milosevic 
pressed for a ceasefire, Holbrooke delayed the signing in order to let the Muslims and Croats 
re-capture more territory from the BSA. Finally, on 10 October 1995, the ceasefire was 
signed. In the Dayton Accords' prepatory meetings, Milosevic made a "strong effort to get 
the sanctions lifted or suspended prior to Dayton."176 This request was rejected, as Hobrooke 
speculated that sanctions could be of further use during the negotiations and implementation 






As the Dayton Accords commence on 01 November 1995, the presidents of Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the FRY (SIM) each his priority clear. For Tudjman, it was eastern 
Slavonia (the last Croatian territory held by the Serbs). For Izetbegovic, a number of issues, 
but mainly the acquisition of lost territory. For Milosevic, it was sanctions. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher offered the suspension of sanctions upon the initialing of an 
agreement, rather than a formal signing. Holbrooke noted, "This small change in our position 
would give Milosevic more incentive to reach agreement in Dayton, and simultaneously 
relieve some of the strain within the Contact Group over the sanctions issue."177 
Sanctions relief became a main negotiating point for Milosevic. For example, in 
every meeting, he sought for the natural gas and heating oil to be delivered (via pipeline) 
from Russia in order to heat Belgrade homes. When negotiations reached a standstill over 
the creation of a Muslim-controlled, Sarajevo to Gorazde corridor, the United States 
threatened to continue sanctions unless the Serbs complied. Finally, Tony Lake, U.S. 
National Security Advisor, modified the sanctions relief offer to Milosevic. Sanctions would 
be suspended at the initialing of an agreement, but the lifting of sanctions would occur only 
with the implementation and compliance with an agreement.178 Finally, the Dayton Peace 
Accord was signed on 21 November 1995.179 
177Ibid., 236. 
178Ibid., 282. 
179The Bosnian Serbs refused to initial the agreement at the Dayton Conference. However, upon returning 
to Belgrade, Milosevic obtained the Bosnian Serb initials, including Karadzic's, and delivered them to 
Holbrooke. 
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Sanctions continued to be used during the implementation of Dayton. Holbrooke 
threatened Milosevic with the renewal of sanctions if he did not remove Karadzic from the 
Republic of Srpska Presidency and as leader of the SDS, the ultra-nationalist Bosnian Serb 
political party. Milosevic removed Karadzic from office the following day. The September 
1997 national elections placed a moderate Serb in charge of the Bosnian Serb government. In 
return, the United States began to release previously frozen aid funds. 180 The outer wall of 
sanctions and the threat of renewed sanctions continue to be used to facilitate the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Further, sanctions are being used in the 




The signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995 ended the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and thus, the achievement of a major foreign policy goal in the Balkans. The 
UN Security Council determined that sanctions "may well have been the single most 
important reason for the Government in Belgrade changing its policies and accepting a 
negotiated peace agreement in Dayton, United States of America, in November 1995."181 In 
light of the military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina - specifically NATO airstrikes, the 
Croatian offensive in the Krajina, and the Federation offensive - the UN's findings may be 
open to challenge. Nonetheless, even if sanctions were not the decisive factor, they were at 
least a contributing factor in pressuring the FRY (SIM) government to abandon its policy of a 
Greater Serbia. The fact that Milosevic signed the VOPP in March 1993 and that Belgrade 
severed its ties with the Bosnian Serbs in 1994 in return for sanctions relief, both prior to 
NATO airstrikes and the Federation offensive in 1995, indicate that sanctions were at least 
successful in coercing Milosevic to change his policies. 
The UN report's conclusion that sanctions modified the behavior of the Serbians 
appear to be accurate and is echoed by military analyst Edward Luttwak.. Luttwak. notes, "In 
a 1995 article in the influential journal Foreign Affairs Luttwak argued that sanctions 
'modified the conduct of Belgrade's most immoderate leadership' and 'induced whatever 
181UN Security Council, Report o/the Copenhagen Round Table, 24 September 1996. 
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slight propensity has been shown to negotiate. "'182 To summarize, sanctions brought 
Milosevic to the peace table. First, representing the FRY (SIM) at the VOPP negotiations in 
1993 and second, representing the FRY (SIM) and the Bosnian Serbs during the Dayton 
negotiations. 
The factors that made sanctions successful in the case of the FRY (SIM) have been 
identified using HSE's political and economic variables. Of the eleven variables, six political 
and five economic, HSE identify that lead to a favorable sanctions episode, all were present 
in the case of the FRY (SIM). 
In regards to the political variables, companion policies - covert action, quasi-military 
action, and regular military action - were successful against the Serbians. The covert arms to 
the Croats and Muslims coupled with NATO airstrikes tilted the balance on the battlefield in 
favor of the Croatians and the Bosnian Federation. The duration of the sanctions was within 
HSE's findings and significant international cooperation existed during the sanctions episode. 
International assistance to the FRY (SIM) was virtually non-existent which further 
exacerbated the FRY (SIM), s acute political and economic problems. Finally, the sender 
countries' prior relations with the FRY (SIM) were neutral to good. Relations and trading 
practices developed with the FRY (SIM) during World War IT and the Cold War era or 
developed because of strong ethnic ties (the Russian-Slavic connection), made the sanctions 
much more effective. 
182Edward Luttwak's article in Foreign Affairs, quoted in Fourth Freedom Forum. The Case o/Yugoslavia 
[on line] (The Fourth Freedom Forum: Fall 1997, accessed 10 September 1998); available from 
http://www.goldendome.netlulfourthfreedomlinforumlyugo.htm1; Internet. 
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In regards to the economic variables, the sanctions placed a debilitating cost on the 
FRY (SIM) as indicated by the dramatic decline in the country's GDP. As mentioned earlier, 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia may bear responsibility in this decline. Given that is 
the case, at the very least, economic sanctions prevented the FRY (SIM) economy from 
recovering from the breakup. Economic sanctions also disrupted trade with the FRY (SIM),s 
major trading partners. The NATO countries alone accounted for 61.7 percent of the former 
Yugoslavia's exports and 56.7 percent of its imports, and it was these countries who 
primarily provided the assets for sanction enforcement. Further, the sender countries' 
economies were much larger than that of the FRY (SIM). For example, the German and 
Italian economies were 98.7 percent larger than the FRY (SIM), s economy. The size of the 
senders' economies in relation to the FRY (SIM),s economy also indicates that the costs to 
the sender countries were minimal. 
HSE offer nine recommendations or conditions for implementing a successful 
sanctions episode. While there are some minor exceptions, this case, in general, follows 
those recommendations. Their analysis states that countries in distress or are experiencing 
significant problems are far more likely to concede to the sender's demands, as was the 
situation in the FRY (SIM) case. Economic sanctions are also more effective against former 
friends and close trading partners; yet, the cost to the sender country is minimal while at the 
same time, imposing a heavy burden on the target. In the FRY (SIM) case, the target country 
had strong economic and trade ties to Europe, however, as a percentage of total trade, the 
various European nations did not have strong ties with the FRY (SIM). 
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The FRY (SIM) case's rejoinders to HSE's recommendations come in the areas of 
success and duration, the use of sanctions to achieve modest goals, the notion that unilateral 
sanctions are more effective, and that sender governments should think through their means 
and objectives before implementing sanctions. 
HSE state that sanctions need to be imposed quickly and decisively to avoid evasion 
and the mobilization of domestic opinion; further, "sanctions imposed slowly or 
incrementally may simply strengthen the target government at home as it marshals the forces 
of nationalism. 183 One of the shortcomings in the UN sanction episode on the FRY (SIM) 
was that it was not decisive. Loopholes, namely the allowance for transshipments through 
FRY (SIM), existed in the initial sanctions regime (UNSeR 757). These loopholes, 
successfully utilized by the FRY (SIM), were not closed until UNSeR 820 was passed in 
April 1993. In regards to a reactive rise in nationalism, Milosevic's rise to power was based 
on nationalism and this factor would have been present whether or not sanctions were in 
place. Returning to the recommendation of imposing sanctions quickly and decisively, one 
must remember that Milosevic supported the VOPP prior to the tightening of sanctions by 
UNSeR 820. Whether or not he would have supported future peace initiatives without 
UNSeR 820 is not known. Intuitively, however, it makes sense to implement sanctions that 
are not suspect to circumvention. 
The FRY (SIM) case represented one where the sender countries were trying to 
extract a major policy change from Milosevic. HSE conclude that sanctions have a greater 
183HSE, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 100. 
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chance for success if the policy change being sought was modest in nature. This raises the 
question of whether the other variables in the case have a stronger influence on the outcome 
of a sanctions episode. In other words, if the presence of other variables is so predominant, 
then they outweigh favorable variables that are not present in the case. For example, the 58.3 
percent drop in GDP the FRY (S/M) experienced from 1990-1993 far exceeds HSE's 
findings that the target's cost should be 4.5 percent (for cases seeking major policy changes). 
Whether the predominance of one favorable variable may compensate for the absence of 
another is a topic for further research. 
HSE's recommendation that sanctions should be unilateral is one of their most 
controversial recommendations. However, one policy analyst states, "In today's global 
economy, foreign rivals quickly and easily replace American companies to meet the needs of 
a target country's market."184 In fact, the HSE study does indicate a sharp decline in success 
from 1970 to 1990 when the United States implemented unilateral sanctions. Their overall 
finding from the 115 cases, however, indicate that multilateral sanctions are not necessarily 
better. Written in 1990, their finding may be subject to revision due to the emergence of the 
global marketplace and declining U.S. hegemony. In the FRY (SIM) case, multinational (as 
well as multi-nongovernmental agency) cooperation existed and made the sanction episode 
much more effective. 
184Robert P. O'Quinn, "A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions," The Backgrounder [on line] (The Heritage 
Foundation: 25 June 1997, accessed 28 April 1998); available from 
http://www.heritage.org!heritagellibrary/categories/tradelbgI126.htm1; Internet. . 
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HSE also recommend that sender governments should think through their means and 
objectives before implementing sanctions. The present use of sanctions is reactionary and 
without thought in regards to objectives and means. This author terms this use as the Curtis 
LeMay-approach to sanctions.185 Sanctions need to be thought out prior to their use. Clear-
cut goals and objectives must be defined and communicated to the target country. Further, a 
potential target country's economic vulnerabilities must be identified to determine whether or 
not sanctions would be effective. For example, the FRY (S/M) was vulnerable to sanctions 
due to their reliance on foreign trade. Intelligence agencies could playa crucial part in 
defining these vulnerabilities. Further, if financial sanctions are determined to be a more 
effective tool of coercion, then intelligence agencies could use their collection assets to 
identify the vulnerabilities of a target country and its leadership. As a result, sanctions could 
be targeted against the target country's leadership, bypassing the general population or 'non-
combatants,' to use a military term. 
Finally, regarding HSE's recommendation that sanctions be quick and decisive, 
reform is needed within the United Nations in order to quickly and efficiently implement 
sanctions. Slow or inadequate monitoring and enforcement have weakened UN-mandated 
sanctions. This was certainly true with the delayed establishment of the SAM-teams 
monitoring the FRY (S/M) border. The maritime interception operation in the Adriatic also 
took time to establish itself. A timely imposition of sanctions would help to prevent the 
185U.S. Air Force General who was the ftrst commander of the Stragegic Air Command. Le May was an 
advocate of strategic bombing, both conventional and nuclear. 
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target country from seeking out trade alternatives to the sanctions and adopting measures that 
would circumvent the sanctions regime.186 
Economic sanctions played an important role in the termination of hostilities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. They continue to be used against the FRY (SIM) to coerce its support 
to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as human 
rights concerns in the FRY (SIM) province of Kosovo. While this thesis finds a favorable 
analysis on the use of sanctions against the FRY (SIM) in achieving peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, it is not a blanket endorsement of the use of economic sanctions. Sanctions 
may have reached a point of diminishing returns, as indicated by the return to power of 
Bosnian Serb nationalists in the recent Bosnia-Herzegovina election. Further, the threat of 
re-imposing trade sanctions did not seem to dissuade the FRY (SIM) from persecuting ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo, nor did they coerce the Bosnian Serbs to support a single peace plan to 
end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A complete analysis, including economic, political, 
social, and cultural studies, of the target country must be conducted prior to the imposition of 
sanctions if they are to have a chance in achieving foreign policy goals. 
186Por more detailed recommendations regarding UN sanctions reform. see Strembleau, Sharpening 
International Sanctions and Hull, Imposing International Sanctions. 
107 
108 
APPENDIX A: MARITME ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
UN sanctions against Belgrade highlighted the importance of a target's volume of 
trade in determining its vulnerability to sanctions. A target who$e foreign trade accounts for 
a large share of its total economic activity is more susceptible to sanctions. The FRY (SIM), s 
presanctions economic statistics show exports and imports represented 19 and 23 percent of 
the economy, respectively, indicating a tangible reliance on trade. 187 The transport method 
capable of economically moving large shipments of bulk goods, such as oil and grain, is via 
merchant vessels. After the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the FRY (S/M) was left with 
only one significant port facility, the port of Bar, to handle such traffic. NATO's maritime 
interception operation in the Adriatic targeted and shut down this trade center of gravity. The 
maritime interception operation was a critical component of making economic sanctions 
effective against the FRY (SIM). This annex will identify the contributions the maritime 
intereception operation made to the sanction episode on the FRY (S/M). 
The use of the naval blockade as a means of enforcing embargoes has been a part of 
naval operations for over four centuries.188 From the Napoleonic Wars to World Wars One 
and Two to the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, naval forces have been 
and will become increasingly important in achieving national foreign policy goals and 
187Department of State, Interagency Task Force, UN Sanctions Against Belgrade: Lessons Learned/or 
Future Regimes, Department of State Publication 10357, 1996,6. 
188Thomas, ''The Use of Naval Forces," 1. 
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stability in the international system by way of maritime interception. In the post-Cold War 
era, maritime interception in support of embargoes provides a flexible tool in enforcement. 
"That flexibility is achieved in part from maritime advantages," according to U.S. Admiral 
Frank B. Kelso II, in that "the inherent flexibility and mobility continue to give our nation's 
leaders the greatest variety of possible responses. Naval forces can sail in international 
waters without anyone else's permission."189 This "new" tool is one that is devised for '''a 
new security environment,' where the focus of U.S. Navy missions will be 'nation-building, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, oceanographic research, and disaster relief. "'190 In 
that new security environment, maritime forces "are going to be an enabling force to help 
find a political solution [author's emphasis] rather than a coercive force in a traditional sense 
[force itself will not be the solution]."191 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, maritime 
interception in applying the sanctions regime had the aspects of peacemaking and conflict 
prevention. As it has been shown in the proceeding chapters, economic sanctions had a 
crucial role in the termination of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and maritime interception 
was a critical component in the enforcement of those sanctions. 
This annex will briefly offer a summary of the historical international legal 
framework that permits the use of economic sanctions and embargoes as foreign policy tools. 
From there, a historical background on the sanctions imp<?sed against the former Yugoslavia 
189 Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, USN, Keynote Address of the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium 
35, U.S. Naval War College (1993), quoted in Fielding, Maritime Interception, 339. 
190Ibid. 
191 Ibid., 341. 
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and how U.S. and NATO maritime forces enforced those sanctions will be described. The 
operational strategy of the Alliance's navies will then be described in terms of Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy by Sir Julian S. Corbett. Finally, the effects that maritime 
interdiction had on the former Yugoslavia will be addressed by looking at the tonnage and 
value of the material intercepted. 
B. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal framework authorizing the use of blockades has developed over the 
centuries of naval warfare. The legal framework establishing the lawfulness for today's use 
of blockades is grounded in five conventions or treaties: the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the 
1909 Declaration of London, the United Nations Charter, the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Law of Anned Conflict Principles. The principles 
set forth in these documents were primarily derived from attempts to codify customary 
intemationallaws of the sea, however, due to the complexities of innovations in naval 
warfare, as well as political realities in times of war, this codifying process has proven to be 
problematic. 
In codifying customary law, the Declarations of Paris and London served two major 
purposes. The first established the legal basis that would allow one belligerent to suppress 
the adversary's ability to sustain its ability to wage war. The second purpose was to specify 
the rights of neutrals during armed conflict. This second purpose was primarily in 
recognition of the need of neutrals to carry on world trade and maintain a stable world 
economy. 
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1. 1856 Declaration of Paris 
The Declaration of Paris "establishes the basic principle that blockades, in order to be 
binding, must be effective" and that they "must be operationally adequate to prevent ingress 
or egress from the blockaded coastline."192 The third principle states that the blockade must 
have an adequate number of ships with the proper weapon systems and proper positioning in 
order to effectively enforce the blockade. From this principle evolves the form of blockade 
as a "line or cordon of ships, preferable within sight of each other, positioned off the 
immediate coast of the blockaded party."193 With this form of blockade established, the 
legality of patrols and distant blockades were initially questionable. The Allied distant 
blockades of Germany during World War I and World War IT answered this legal question, 
thus establishing another legally acceptable form of naval blockade. 
2. 1909 Declaration of London 
The Declaration of London went to great lengths to provide a comprehensive list of 
the basic legal requirements of blockade. The Declaration established five basic principles of 
a blockade: 
192Ibid .. 3. 
193Ibid .. 4. 
• The right to establish a blockade is limited to states openly engaged 
in hostilities. 
• The area to be blockaded and the start date must be promulgated. 
• The blockade must be enforced with adequate forces, meaning it 
cannot simply be declared. 
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• The blockade must apply to all vessels, regardless of nationality. 
• Neutral rights must be respected - the blockade cannot be extended 
to neutral ports.194 
In addition, the distant blockade is prohibited by Article 17's requirement that capture take 
place within the area of operations or warships enforcing the blockade. The blockade's area 
of operations is defined in Article 1: "[a] blockade must not extend beyond the ports and 
coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy."195 
Finally, the London Declaration categorizes the material that may be considered 
contraband and therefore, captured. The Declaration outlines three categories: articles that 
constitute absolute contraband, articles that constitute conditional contraband, and articles 
that may not be treated as contraband. Articles in the absolute and conditional categories 
may be declared as contraband without notice to the adversary. 
While the London Declaration was not ratified, the Allies in W orld War I adopted and 
applied the principles of the Declaration at the outbreak of the war. Due to the nature and . 
gravity of the war, the Allies abandoned these principles in 1916 after determining them to be 
too restraining. Nonetheless, the Declarations of Paris and London remain an important part 
of the U.S. Navy's doctrine. ''This is acknowledged and reflected in The Commander's 
Handbook on the Law o/Naval Operations o/the U.S. Navy (Commander's Handbook)" 
194Thomas, ''The Use of Naval Forces," 3. 
195Fielding, Maritime Interception, 4. 
113 
where the blockade principles in this publication are the basic principles of blockade 
established in the Declarations of 1856 and 1909.196 
3. United Nations Charter 
The UN Charter states that blockades, which is considered a use of military force, 
must be undertaken within UN Charter provisions. The UN considers a blockade as an act of 
aggression (under the UN's "Definition of Aggression"). However, the use of force is 
permitted under the Charter if "it qualifies as a valid measure of self-defense undertaken in 
accordance with Article 51, a measure authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VIT 
generally or under Article 42 specifically; an enforcement action within a regional 
arrangement undertaken with the authorization of the Security Council under Article 53, or 
otherwise authorized by an organ of the UN."197 
The status of neutrality is limited under the UN Charter, and effects the 
implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Neutrality is possible only when the Security 
Council does not designate an aggressor under Chapter VIT. Once a state is designated an 
aggressor, "Article 2(5) obliges member states to assist the United Nations 'in any action it 
takes in accordance with the present charter, and shall refrain from giving any assistance to 
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action."'198 





measures decided upon by the Security Council. In the case of a veto on enforcement action 
(under Chapter VII) by the Security Council, however, states may retain their neutrality. 
By including embargoes as an act of force, the United Nations has set guidelines on 
the enforcement of economic sanctions by naval forces. Further, it has mandated that neutral, 
member states must comply with enforcement resolutions passed by the UN Security 
Council. 
4. 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
This convention established the extension of the three nautical mile territorial sea to 
twelve nautical miles.199 Additionally, it also established exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 
and contiguous zones (CZ). While the extension of territorial seas to 12 nautical miles 
removed over 3,000,000 square miles of ocean from hostile action, EEZ's and CZ's were 
recognized as high seas, thus allowing belligerent rights such as visit, search, and seizure to 
be asserted in these areas.200 This Convention also establishes critical international straits 
throughout the world, as well as rules restricting the obstruction of those straits by 
belligerents or neutral countries. For example, belligerent states may not use neutral or 
international straits as a place of sanctuary or a base of operations and must refrain from the 
use of force in those straits. 
199The concept of territorial waters having a three mile limit was obtained from the range of a cannon shot. 
2°Ou,id., 8. 
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The 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea "has been adopted as the customary 
practice by the majority of maritime nations. The effect has been to expand the area to be 
covered in enforcing a blockade if no infringement of the territorial sea is to take place."201 
5. Law of Armed Conflict 
While a blockade may conform to the legal and customary laws of the seas as 
described above, naval forces are still r~quired to follow the basic principles of the law of 
armed conflict. Those principles are military necessity, humanity, and proportionality.202 
In summary, the Conventions of London and Paris were attempts to codify the 
customary laws of the sea. After some modifications, the U.N. Charter and the Law of the 
Sea Convention helped to legitimize the codification of customary laws of the sea. All of 
which helped established the legal framework for blockades. This process has been 
somewhat problematic, however. Historical examples, such as the implementation of the 
distant blockade in W orId War I, show us that the principles of law will be transgressed if the 
belligerent nation deems it necessary for its survival. In the past, the specific features of the 
conflict dictated the form that the blockade takes and as a result, changed the customary and 
codified laws of the sea. "The only convention or treaty principles ,that have been preserved 
in practice are those that proved workable or practical considering the manner of warfare and 
the state of weaponry technology at the time."203 
201Thomas, "The Use of Naval Forces," 11. 
202Department of the Navy, Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP I-14M FMFM 
7-10 (1996). 
203Fielding, Maritime Interception, 10. 
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In the case of the embargo on the former Yugoslavia, the form of the blockade strictly 
adhered to the conventions as established by the U.N. and certain provisions of the London 
and Paris Conventions. That strict adherence was due to the fact that those naval forces 
imposing the blockade were not belligerents in the Yugoslavian conflict. Rather, they were 
conducting a peacemaking operation vice being belligerents in an armed conflict. As such, 
the blockading forces maintained strict adherence to established laws of the sea. 
C. MARITIME INTERCEPTION - ENFORCING THE SANCTIONS 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 787 in an attempt to tighten and enforce the 
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. UNSeR 713 and 757 only had monitoring 
, 
i 
provisions in them, while Resolution 787 allowed maritime forces to halt, inspect, or divert 
vessels suspected of breaking 713 or 757. Resolution 787 was adopted in July 1992. 
Prior to 787's adoption, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) began 
monitoring shipments into Serbia via the Adriatic Sea and the Danube River. This operation 
began in July 1992 and was entitled MARITIME MONITOR (NATO) and SHARP 
VIGILANCE (WEU). NATO warships (from STANAVFORMED) patrolled off the 
Montenegrin coast while the WEU units patrolled the Straits of Otranto. These operations 
only monitored the compliance to UNSCR's 713 and 757. 
Adopted in November 1993, Resolution 787 addressed the leaks in sanctions by: "1) 
instituting an interception operation in both the Adriatic and the Danube with riparian states . 
. . 2) require the transshipment of vital commodities ... be approved on a case-by-case basis 
by the Sanctions Committee, and 3) stationing observation posts on the borders of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina."204 As a result, the North Atlantic Council announced that NATO would 
coordinate and cooperate with WEU forces in the implementation ofUNSCR 787. This 
resulted in the Operations MARITIME GUARD (NATO component) and SHARP FENCE 
(WEU component). MARITIME GUARD was conducted in the northern Adriatic, while 
SHARP FENCE was established in the Strait of Otranto. By June 1993 and in response to 
UNSCR 820, the NATO and WEU operations were combined to form Operation SHARP 
GUARD. 
SHARP GUARD was initiated to conduct operations to monitor and enforce 
compliance with UN sanctions in accordance with UNSCR 713, 757, 787, and 820. Its 
maritime forces, organized under Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440) prevented all 
unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of the FRY (SIM) and all arms 
from entering the former Yugoslavia. 
CTF 440 was formed with NATO forces, mainly the Standing Naval Force 
Mediterranean and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, together with the WEU Contingency 
Maritime Force. Organized in combined task groups, NATO and WEU ships conducted 
continuous patrolling in the southern Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargoes. They established 
direct communication with masters of transiting vessels to detennine the nature of their 
cargo, its origin, and destinations. Vessels entering or leaving the territorial waters of FRY 
(SIM) were halted and inspected to verify compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 
or were diverted to an approved port or anchorage. The same procedure was applied for 
204Ibid., 239. 
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ships enroute to other ports in fonner Yugoslavia. Vessels not in compliance were escorted 
to the Italian territorial waters and turned over to national authorities. 
The overall operational control of Sharp Guard was delegated to Admiral Mario 
Angeli, Italian Navy, as Commander, Combined Task Force 440 (CCTF 440). He was 
assisted by Rear Admiral Gianfranco Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CTF 440. Admiral 
Angeli is the Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF 440, his staff 
was complemented by a WEU staff element. 
Surface ships operated within two operational combined task groups (CTG) at sea 
while conducting operations in the Adriatic Sea. A third task group had responsibility for 
ships conducting training or port visits. Operational responsibilities rotated among the task 
group commanders. During the latest period of embargo enforcement there were two 
operational task groups, commanded by Commodore Frank Ropers, Gennan Navy 
(COMSTANA VFORMED) and Rear Admiral Nicola Azzolini, Italian Navy 
(COMWEUCONMARFOR). Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MP A) operated under operational 
control of CTF 440 through the Commander of Combined Task Force 431, Rear Admiral 
John R. Ryan, U.S. Navy. 
Nations contributing maritime forces were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Gennany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The participating surface units were primarily frigates and 
maritime patrol aircraft were P-3C Orions, Atlantiques, or Nimrods. An U.S. Navy Aegis 
cruiser on anti-air warfare duty ("Red Crown") and a NATO AWACS aircraft also supported 
these units. 
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SACEUR established interception procedures on behalf of the nations of NATO and 
WEU. The guidelines set specific steps as follows: 
From 22 November 1992 all merchant ships entering the Adriatic Sea and 
ships sailing from posts in the Adriatic are to contact the warships 
operating the inspection regime when approaching parallel 39 degrees 55 
minutes north (Otranto Channel) calling the inspection coordinator on 
VHF Channel 16 using the callsign "watchman." Ships should be 




name of owners 
last port of call and date of departure 
destinations(s) in the Adriatic and ETA 
general description of cargo 
ETA at parallel 39 degrees 55 minutes north 
for ships leaving the Adriatic, date, time of passing 
parallel 39 degrees 55 minutes north, on inbound passage205 
If the merchant vessel was uncooperative, each SHARP GUARD unit had two boarding and 
inspection teams. The boarding team takes control of the ship and then the inspecting team 
goes aboard and checks the vessel for compliance. 
While the initial operation was solely one of monitoring compliance, the eventual 
results from these maritime interception operations were very successful in enforcing the 
economic sanctions on the FRY (SIM) and the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. The 
specific effects these operations had on the FRY (SIM) will be addressed in the section 




D. OPERATIONAL STRATEGY 
Operation SHARP GUARD (1992 - 1996) consisted of two areas of operations. The 
first one was situated off the coast of Montenegro, just outside of the 12 nautical mile 
territorial seas. This area contained five operating boxes that were situated parallel to the 
Montenegrin coastline. The second one was placed abreast the Strait of Otranto, a designated 
international strait. This area was also divided into operational boxes. Each box in the two 
operating areas usually had a warship in it. 
The purpose of the Montenegrin area was two fold: first, to prevent merchant vessels 
from entering and exiting Montenegrin ports and second, to ensure the Yugoslav Navy did 
not sortie in order to interfere with the maritime interception operations. The Otranto area's 
main purpose was to intercept (board, if necessary) merchant ships traveling through the 
Otranto chokepoint. In this operation, there were effectively two types of blockades, a naval 
blockade and a commercial blockade. Sir Julian Corbett describes the differences in these 
two types of blockades in his book Classics of Sea Power. 
Corbett describes two types of blockades, the naval and commercial. A naval 
blockade is to "seek either to prevent an enemy's armed force [from] leaving port, or to make 
certain it shall be brought to action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it 
puts to sea."206 In the case of the FRY (SIM), the purpose of the naval blockade along the 
Montenegrin coast was to prevent their navy from putting to sea in order to disrupt the 
maritime interception operations. Because the mission, in general, is a peacemaking mission, 
206Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911; reprint, 
Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1988),92 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
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the blockade was not meant to entice the adversary to armed action. The Montenegrin coast 
operating area also was commercial in nature, but as a secondary role. 
A commercial blockade's "immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's sea-
borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying him the use of trade 
communications."207 The SHARP GUARD operating area in the Straits of Otranto was a 
commercial blockade, as the naval forces patrolled this choke point and intercepted any 
merchant vessel passing through. 
Corbett provides two other categories of blockades, the close blockade and the open 
blockade. While the definitions of both are self-explanatory, their purpose is not. The close 
blockade's "dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a 
certain area and for a certain purpose."208 Again, the forces operating off the coast of 
Montenegro were preventing the Yugoslav Navy from disrupting the open, commercial 
blockade in the Straits of Otranto. 
During the NATO's Operation SHARP GUARD, close and open blockades were used 
to implement economic sanctions on the Former Yugoslavia. The close blockade was 
conducted off the Montenegrin coast in order to keep an "eye" on Yugoslav naval 
movements. This allowed for the enforcement of the economic embargo in the Straits of 
Otronto. The close blockade kept the Yugoslav Navy in port and away from other NATO 




antiquated method due to "new" technologies such as the torpedo and mine (in 1911 terms). 
However, NATO's naval force was technologically and operationally superior to the 
Yugoslav naval force, thus allowing it to conduct a close blockade. The Yugoslav Navy, in 
comparison, has the following order of battle: 
• Submarines: (2) Sava SS, (3) Heroj SS, and (5) Una SSM mini-subs. 
• Frigates: (2) Kotor FF, (2) Split FF. Both based on Soviet built Koni FF 
hulls and include the SS-N-2B Styx surface to surface missiles. 
• Guided Missile Patrol Boats: (5) Koncar PTG with 2 X SS-N-2B Styx; 
(4) OSA I with 4 X SS-N-2A 
• Patrol Boats: (12) Shershen PTB, torpedoes only209 
Nonetheless, with today's preponderance of economic sanctions, both forms of blockade 
continue to be relevant methods of naval warfare when countering a weaker and less capable 
force. 
E. OUTCOMES OF MARITIME INTERCEPTION 
Bulk goods, such as oil and grain, typically are shipped internationally via merchant 
vessels - the transport method capable of economically moving large shipments.210 The port 
facility at Bar was the FRY (SIM)'s only significant presanctions port. Bar could handle 
merchant vessels of modest size, whereas the FRY (SIM), s other Adriatic ports could 
accommodate only small vessels and were not connected by internal rail lines to other parts 
of Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, Belgrade relied on it for a good portion of its 
209"Yugos1av Navy," Janes Annual Defense Review (London: Janes Publishing, 1996). 
2100epartment of State, UN Sanctions Against Belgrade, 4. 
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international trade. With only one major port to blockade, not only were embargo operations 
much easier, but the effects on the FRY (SIM),s economy were much more severe. 
During the period 22 November 1992 to 18 June 1996, NATO and WEU forces 
challenged, boarded or diverted to a port for inspection the following numbers of merchant 
vessels: 
Challenged -74,192 
Boarded and inspected at sea - 5,951 
Diverted and inspected in port - 1,480 
These results were achieved by: 
Ship days spent at sea - 19,699 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft sorties - 7,151 211 
Other than an isolated incident in early 1994, sea-borne trade to FRY (SIM) was effectively 
eliminated through the Adriatic. 
To gain an appreciation on the amount of goods a ship can carry, the following 
example is provided. The requirements for transporting 30,000 metric tons are: 
One Ship Delivery 
• (30) 1,000-ton barges 
.. 
(600) 50-ton railcar loads 
.. 
(1,500) 20-ton truckloads212 
211North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Sharp Guard Fact Sheet" [on line] (accessed 21 March 1998); 
available at http://www.nato.intlifor/un/un-reso1.htm; Internet. 
212Department of State, UN Sanctions Against Belgrade, 6. 
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The maritime interception operation forced the FRY (SIM) to seek other routes for 
trade entering and leaving their country. Their options were via the Danube River, rail lines, 
and motor routes. Because of the limited amount cargo planes can carry, especially in 
comparison to one, 30,000 metric ton ship delivery, trade entering the FRY (SIM) by air, if 
any, was negligible. 
While initially successful, trade on the Danube River was shut down by early 1994 
when monitors were placed in Bulgaria and Romania (resulting from UNSCRs 787 and 820). 
Geographic conditions (extreme mountainous region) in the Balkans prevented numerous 
motor routes and rail routes from entering the FRY (SIM). FRY (SIM),s reliance on seven 
rail connections to neighboring states made Belgrade reliant on moving goods via freight 
train. Again, UNSCRs 787 and 820 place monitors on those routes. Finally, the State 
Department's report states, "although Serbia [FRY (SIM] had approximately 100 road 
connections with surrounding states, Belgrade counted on access to only a handful of these 
routes for shipping because most of these roads' contours, grades, or surfaces made them 
unsuitable for large-scale tractor-trailer movement."213 
While it is difficult to place an exact value on the effects of the embargo due to the 
economic disruption caused by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, one can still look 
at the trade figures for each of new countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and 
intuitively see the dramatic impact that sanctions had on the FRY (SIM) economy (see table 
213lbid.,9. 
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A-I). The following figures come from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook. All figures are in millions of U.S. Dollars. 
Table A-l. Trade Statistics for the former Yugoslavia, 
for 1991. in millions of U.S. Dollars 
Exports hnports 
Yugoslavia 13.953 14.737 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, 1996. 
1991 is the final year of trade statistics for the former Yugoslavia. There are no trade 
statistics available for 1992 for the countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia. 
Table A-2 shows the trade figures for FRY (SIM), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia. Again, all figures are in millions of U.S. Dollars. 
Table A-2. Trade Statistics. in millions of U.S. Dollars 
Exports hnports 
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995 
FRY (SIM) 4 46 39 88 185 249 
Croatia 3,913 4,259 4,372 4,724 5,220 7,105 
Slovenia 6,083 6,828 8,286 6,529 7,304 9,452 
B-H 85 46 52 424 644 912 
Macedonia 690 869 1.038 950 1.352 1.654 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1996. 
While trade actually increased for the FRY (SIM) from 1993 to 1995, most of the 
-increases can be attributed to the UNSC's partial easing of trade restrictions on FRY (S/M) in 
response to that countries compliance with various peace initiatives. On the whole, however, 
sanctions devastated FRY (SIM). Prior to the breakup, most of the industrial and 
manufacturing centers were located in Serbian areas of the former Yugoslavia. When 
comparing the FRY (SIM) trade levels to the trade levels of primarily agrarian Macedonia or 
war-tom Bosnia, one can see the effects of the sanctions. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The maritime interception operation in the Adriatic attacked the FRY (S/M) trade 
center of gravity. The FRY (S/M) was then forced to seek other alternatives for its exports 
and imports, none of which were suitable or sufficient alternatives. Maritime interception 
had a major role in effecting foreign policy goals through the use of sanctions enforcement. 
The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is the first major outbreak of hostilities in the 
post-cold war era. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented a program for 
peace in the post-cold era in his Report of the Secretary-General on An Agenda for Peace in 
July 1992. In this report, he contemplates greater involvement of the U.N. in the various 
phases of a crisis and encourages the participation of all local, national, regional, and 
international organizations that can assist in procuring peace and stability in a crisis area. The 
international response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia characterizes this agenda. 
Maritime interception could figure significantly in the Secretary-General's proposals, "not 
only as a method of enforcing sanction, but as a device which moves the United Nations from 
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping into peace enforcement."214 
214Fielding, Maritime Interception, 247. 
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APPENDIX B: NATO AIRS TRIKES IN BOSNIA·HERZEGOVINA 
February 28, 1994: U.S. F-16 fighters shoot down four Bosnian Serb warplanes violating the 
"no-fly" zone in central Bosnia, the first military strike by NATO in its 45-year history. Serbs 
do not react. 
.. 
April 10, 1994: Two U.S. F-16s attack Bosnian Serb positions near Gorazde, a Muslim 
enclave and U.N.-designated "safe area," under attack, 35 miles southeast of Sarajevo. 
Results are inconclusive. 
April 11, 1994: Two U.S. Marine FA-18s attack Serb positions near Gorazde, reportedly 
destroying a tank. Serbs respond by capturing all strategic points around Gorazde. 
Aug. 5, 1994: Two U.S. A-tO jets destroy an aging anti-tank weapon near Sarajevo, after 
Serbs seize heavy weapons from a U.N.-guarded compound. The weapons are later returned. 
Sept. 22, 1994: NATO jets attack a Serb tank near Sarajevo after Serbs attack a French 
armored personnel carrier and defy U.N. demands to remove heavy guns violating a "no-
weapons" zone around the city. Serbs respond by harassing peacekeepers, delaying aid 
convoys, grounding helicopter flights and shutting down the aid airlift to Sarajevo. 
Nov. 21, 1994: NATO warplanes bomb the air base in Serb-held Croatia used by Serb planes 
to raid the neighboring U.N. "safe area" of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia. Serbs fire two 
surface-to-air missiles at two ;British Harrier jets flying over Bosnia. The missiles miss. 
Nov. 23, 1994: About 20 NATO planes hit at least two Serb surface-to-air missile sites near 
Bihac. Warplanes hit one of the targets again because the first raid did not put it out of 
commission. Serbs take dozens of U.N. peacekeepers hostage. 
May 25, 1995: NATO jets strike at Bosnian Serb ammunition depot near the Serb stronghold 
of Pale outside Sarajevo, aftet the Serbs refuse to return heavy weapons taken from UN-
guarded collection sites. 
May 26, 1995: NATO jets again attack Bosnian Serb ammunition dump near Pale. Serbs 
respond by taking more than 370 U.N. peacekeepers hostage, chaining some of them to 
possible NATO targets to prevent further airstrikes. After intervention by Serbian President 
Slob dan Milosevic, the Serbs release all the hostages in batches over several weeks. There 
are rumors the Serbs agreed to the release in exchange for pledges there would be no more 
airstrikes. 
July 11, 1995: Dutch and American jets from NATO attack Bosnian Serb tanks south of the 
enclave of Srebrenica, an UN-declared "safe area'" in an attempt to protect Dutch U.N. 
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peacekeepers and 30,000 people in the town. The Bosnian Serbs overrun the town, sending 
peacekeepers and refugees fleeing in panic. 
August - September 1995: In response to the shelling of Sarajevo's central marketplace by 
the Bosnian Serb Army in August 1995, NATO executed Operation DELIBERAlE FORCE, 
the largest air assault in the history of the Alliance. Also involved were Tomahawk missile 
strikes. 
Source: "Yugoslavia NATO Chronology [on line]," Associated Press, n.d.; Accessed 27 
April 1998; available from http://www.milnet.comJmilnetlyugochrn.htm; Internet. 
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